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DO REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
VIOLATE THE ANTITRUST LAWS?
Christopher M. Holman t
Abstract
The term "reverse payment" has been used as shorthand to
characterize a variety of diverse agreements between patent owners
and alleged infringers that involve a transfer of consideration from
the patent owner to the alleged infringer. Reverse payment
settlements are particularly associated with drug patent challenges
mounted by generic drug companies under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Many, including the Federal Trade Commission, would characterize
these agreements as antitrust violations. However, courts have
generally declined to find these agreements in violation of the
antitrust laws based solely on the presence of a reverse payment.
This article begins in Section II with an overview of the diverse
array of patent settlement agreements that have been classified within
the general taxonomy of "reverse payment settlements." Section III
discusses a variety of specific factors that have led to a natural
proliferation of reverse payments patent settlements between branded
and generic drug companies. Section IV traces the development of the
FTC's position, which would find most reverse payment settlements
presumptively illegal, focusing in particular on its recent ill-fated
enforcement action against Schering-Plough. Section V reviews the
courts' response to antitrust challenges against reverse payment
settlements, and identifies an emerging consensus position that will
find a violation of the antitrust laws only in cases where the
challenged agreement contains restrictions on competition that
exceed the exclusionary potential of the patent. The article concludes
in Sections VI and VII with a discussion of the future prospects for the
antitrust treatment of reverse payments settlements, including a
suggestion that in evaluating the anticompetitive implications of these
agreements more explicit consideration be paid to barriers to market
entry facing potential third party generic competitors.
t Christopher M. Holman, Ph.D., J.D. is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of
Missouri - Kansas City.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2006, U.S. consumers suffered a severe setback
when the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the
case of FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.' At least that is the position
taken by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which asserts that
the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Schering-Plough opens the door to
collusive and anticompetitive agreements between branded drug
companies and their potential generic competitors that keep generic
drugs off the market. 2 In particular, the FTC sees these agreements as
circumventing provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act specifically
intended to promote challenges to patents that delay generic market
entry. 3 By derailing patent challenges and blocking generic
competition, the FTC argues these agreements seriously undermine
the ability of generic competition to bring down consumer drug
prices.
The FTC is not alone in its concern - a number of high-powered
amici joined the Commission in urging the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in Schering-Plough, including attorneys general
representing 34 states and the District of Columbia, 5 the National
Association of Chain Drug Stores, 6 the American Association of
Retired People ("AARP"),7 and Congressman Henry Waxman,8 one
of the two sponsors of the Hatch-Waxman amendments. The
amendments are largely to be credited for the current vitality of the
generic drug industry. 9 A number of commentators have also weighed
I. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006), denying cert. to 402 F.3d
1056 (11 th Cir. 2005).
2. See, e.g., Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FTC, Prepared Statement of the FTC Before the
Special Committee on Aging of the United States Senate on Barriers to Generic Entry 14-19
(July 20, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/07/P052103BarrierstoGenericEntryTestimonySenateO7202006.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Statement Before Aging Committee].
3. See infra Section IV.
4. See, e.g., FTC Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2, at 17-19.
5. Brief for States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Schering-Plough, 126 S. Ct.
2929 (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2454839.
6. Brief for National Association of Chain Drug Stores as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Schering-Plough, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2454843.
7. Brief for American Association of Retired People as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Schering-Plough, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2454841.
8. Brief for Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Schering-Plough, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2462026.
9. See infra Section III.B.2.
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in on the side of the FTC, including leading scholars in the fields of
economics, intellectual property, and antitrust law.' 0
Schering-Plough involved an appeal of an FTC enforcement
action" taken against two so-called "reverse payment" settlement
agreements between Schering-Plough ("Schering"), a branded drug
company and patent owner, and two potential generic competitors
who attempted to enter the market prior to patent expiration by
challenging the patent. 12 The FTC found the agreements to be
unreasonable and illegal restraints of trade, and characterized them as
horizontal market allocation agreements, which are generally per se
violations of the antitrust laws. 13 The Commission announced a
standard of antitrust review that would effectively find any agreement
in which the generic drug company agreed to defer market entry in
exchange for monetary compensation presumptively anticompetitive
and illegal under the antitrust laws, at least when the amount of the
payment exceeded the expected costs of litigating the case.14
However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this standard and
the FTC's legal arguments purporting to support it. 15 The court held
that the FTC erred in giving too little deference to the fact that the
generic products excluded by the agreement were apparently covered
by a presumptively valid patent. 16 In the view of the court, the FTC
failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the
agreement was anything more than a settlement of a legitimate patent
dispute, which courts have actively encouraged. 17 In particular, the
court rejected the FTC's argument that the existence and size of the
reverse payments in and of themselves rendered the agreements
presumptively illegal.18
10. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1720-21 (2003); Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 391 (2003).
11. For a description of FTC's ability to bring enforcement actions, see FTC, A Brief
Overview of the FTC's Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
12. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061-62 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
13. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 86-87 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(I Ith Cir. 2005).
14. Id. at 12, 40.
15. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2929 (2006).
16. Id. at 1068.
17. Id. at 1075.
18. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit is not alone in rejecting the FTC's theory
of presumptive illegality for reverse payment settlements. In fact,
numerous district and appellate courts have considered the issue, and
the emerging consensus is that a reverse payment does not violate the
antitrust laws nor raise any presumption of illegality.' 9 Furthermore,
in a rare split between the two federal agencies tasked with enforcing
the nation's antitrust law, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") declined
to endorse the FTC's position with regard to the legality of these
agreements. 20 To the contrary, the Solicitor General filed an amicus
brief on the behalf of the U.S. government recommending that the
Supreme Court deny the FTC's petition for writ of certiorari in
Schering-Plough, suggesting that "the mere presence of a reverse
payment in the Hatch-Waxman context is not sufficient to establish
that the settlement is unlawful.",
2
'
Section II of this article provides an overview of the diverse
array of patent settlement agreements that have been characterized
within the general taxonomy of "reverse payment settlements."
Section III discusses a variety of specific factors that have led to a
natural proliferation of reverse payments patent settlements between
branded and generic drug companies. Section IV traces the
development of the FTC's position, which would find most reverse
payment settlements presumptively illegal, focusing in particular on
its ill-fated enforcement action against Schering. Section V reviews
the courts' response to antitrust challenges against reverse payment
settlements, and identifies an emerging consensus position that will
find a violation of the antitrust laws only in cases where the
challenged agreement contains restrictions on competition that exceed
the exclusionary potential of the patent. The article concludes in
Sections VI and VII with a discussion of the future prospects for the
antitrust treatment of reverse payments settlements, including a
suggestion that in evaluating the anticompetitive implications of these
agreements more explicit consideration be paid to barriers to market
entry facing potential third party generic competitors.
19. See infra Section V.A.
20. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, FTC v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (No. 05-273), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/SG_20Schering.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Brief Recommending
Denial of Certiorari in Schering-Plough].
21. Id. at 11.
2007]
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II. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT DEFINED
The term "reverse payment" has been used as shorthand to
characterize a variety of diverse patent settlement agreements that
involve a transfer of consideration from the patent owner to the
alleged infringer. 22 In this article, the term is used in a broad sense to
reference any agreement between patent litigants, or potential
litigants, wherein the patent owner agrees to provide some
compensation to the alleged infringer, and the alleged infringer agrees
to delay developing or marketing a product. 23 The "reverse"
designation refers to the direction of the payment from the patentee to
alleged infringer; in most patent litigation settlements, any payment
will typically flow from the alleged infringer to the patentee.24
Although reverse payment settlements can and probably do
occur in other contexts, it appears that all of the reverse payment
settlements that have been challenged as antitrust violations have
occurred in the context of challenges by generic drug companies of
branded drug patents, referred to herein as "Paragraph IV
litigations. '' 25 Because of the huge drop in drug price that occurs when
such patent challenges succeed and the atypical direction of payment
flow, these settlements have garnered much interest from the FTC and
others.26
The quintessential and most extreme example of a reverse
payment settlement would be an agreement terminating litigation,
pursuant to which the potential generic competitor would agree to
stay off the market for the full duration of the patent term in exchange
for cash payments. This tends to be the popular perception of reverse
payments settlements by a public demanding lower drug prices and
22. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
23. Reverse payments are also sometimes referred to as "exclusion payments" or "brand
payments." These terms are generally used interchangeably herein.
24. At least when the payment is in the form of cash and the like. As explained by Judge
Posner, generally any patent settlement will include compensation to the alleged infringer in
some form, else there would be no reason to settle, but usually this compensation is not in the
form of a cash payment and hence will tend to be harder to identity and quantify. See discussion
infra Section V.D.
25. The term "Paragraph IV litigation" references 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), the
statutory provision that provides the basis for generic drug companies to challenge the patents of
branded (i.e., innovator) drug companies. See infra Section III.B.2.
26. See infra Section IV.
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deeply suspicious of the pharmaceutical industry.27 In fact, however, a
closer look at the facts of individual cases reveals that few, if any,
reverse payment settlements are as simple as that or as blatantly anti-
competitive.
For example, most agreements that terminate a patent dispute
involve a negotiated market entry date for the generic product that
substantially precedes the date of patent expiration. This negotiated
market entry date typically occurs later than would have likely
occurred if the generic company had prevailed in the patent dispute,
i.e., the parties split the remaining patent term. In Schering-Plough,
for example, Schering's patent was set to expire September 5, 2006.28
Schering's 1997 agreements with two generic patent challengers,
Upsher and ESI, allowed for generic entry by Upsher on September 1,
2001, (roughly splitting the remaining patent term in half) and by ESI
on January 1, 2004.9 Settlements such as this, involving a negotiated
generic entry date prior to patent expiration, can promote competition
by providing a guaranteed reduction in the effective patent term that
would not have occurred absent the patent challenge. Of course,
depending upon the merits of the case, a litigation carried through
final judgment might better serve consumer interests by facilitating
accelerated generic competition. A final judgment favoring the
generic challenger would not only result in an earlier date of generic
entry, but defeating the patent might also open up the market to third
party generic competition.3° Still, a negotiated early entry date clearly
attenuates some of the competition concerns raised by the more
extreme scenario whereby the patent challenger agrees to stay off the
market for the entire remaining term of the patent.
In another common twist on the simple model of reverse
payment settlement, the litigants do not settle the underlying dispute,
but the generic company agrees to stay off the market for some period
of time while the patent litigation remains pending. These types of
agreements are often referred to as "interim settlements," or "partial
settlement agreements," and can take on the attributes of a privately
27. See e.g., Paul Wynn, Payment Settlements Keep Generics Off the Market, DRUG
ToPics, Aug. 7, 2006,
http://www.dnugtopics.com/drugtopics/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=360620.
28. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
29. Id. at 1059-60.
30. "Third party generic competition" refers to generic competition from generic
companies not party to the settlement agreement.
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negotiated preliminary injunction. 31 Various attributes of partial
settlement agreements can render them potentially more or less pro-
competitive than final settlement agreements.
On the positive side, partial settlement agreements can allow the
parties to diligently pursue the underlying litigation to final judgment
without exposing both parties to the huge potential losses facing each
party if the generic enters the market but is subsequently found to
have infringed a valid patent. Of course, many would argue that the
same could be accomplished by means of a preliminary injunction.
However, for various reasons the parties might prefer a privately
negotiated agreement to defer market entry. For example, instead of
being required by the court to post a large bond, the patent owner
might prefer to make negotiated payments. There is always a chance
that a court might decline to enter a preliminary injunction, even if
there is substantial merit to the case.32 Alternatively, even without a
preliminary injunction, the generic competitor could simply stay off
the market to avoid the risk of adverse judgment, but this could be
extremely expensive, particularly for a small, cash-strapped generic
company. The deferral of anticipated cash flow, and the huge
potential profits that they will have forfeited if they had ultimately
prevailed in the litigation, might make it infeasible for the generic to
delay market entry without some form of compensation. Negotiated
payments allow the parties to share the costs of avoiding the risk of
premature market entry, under terms determined by their assessment
of the merits of the case and other pertinent factors.3 3
On the other hand, interim settlements can tend to prolong
litigation. Because the generic company is benefiting from a steady,
and typically substantial, incoming flow of cash payments, and the
branded company is continuing to reap supracompetitive profits as the
31. Three out of four FTC challenges mentioned in FTC Generic Drug Study involved
interim settlements. Only one out of twenty final settlements was challenged, the one at issue in
Schering-Plough. See FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY, 24, 25 & nn.2-3 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY].
32. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) ("In resisting a preliminary injunction, however, one need not make out a case of
actual invalidity. Vulnerability is the issue at the preliminary injunction stage, while validity is
the issue at trial. The showing of a substantial question as to invalidity thus requires less proof
than the clear and convincing showing necessary to establish invalidity itself.").
33. For an expanded defense of reverse payments in the context of partial settlement
agreements, see James Langenfeld & Wenqing Li, Intellectual Property and Agreements to
Settle Patent Disputes: The Case of Settlement Agreements with Payments from Branded to
Generic Drug Manufacturers, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 777 (2003).
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sole purveyor of the patented drug, there is little incentive for either
party to push for a speedy resolution of the matter. Compounding the
problem is the fact that in many cases these agreements effectively
restrict market entry by third party generic manufacturers. 14 The
anticompetitive potential of interim settlement agreements is
substantial, and both the FTC and the courts have treated interim
settlement agreements as generally more problematic than final
settlements.35 For example, in its 2003 Generic Drug Study, the FTC
identified twenty final settlements that settled litigation between
brand-name company and a first generic applicant, but apparently
chose to challenge only one with an enforcement action (5%).36 On
the other hand, the FTC identified only four interim settlements, and
challenged three out of the four (75%). 37 All of the challenged
settlements involved reverse payments.38
Turning to the courts, four appellate level decisions have
considered the legality of reverse payments settlements. 39 The two
cases involving partial settlements ultimately resulted in a
determination of illegality; 40 while in the other two cases involving
final settlements, the legality of the agreements was upheld.4'
Other deviations from the simple model occur when the payment
is not a simple transfer of cash. For example, in some interim
settlements, the payment is contingent upon the defendant prevailing
on appeal, i.e., a functional equivalent of the escrow account that
would be required in a court-ordered preliminary injunction. 2 In
other cases, payment is contingent upon the generic company
achieving marketing approval from FDA.43
34. See infra Sections IV.A, V.A.
35. See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 34-35.
36. Id. at 25 & n.2.
37. Id. at 25 &n.3.
38. See infra Section IV.A-B.
39. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830); Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
40. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 1294 (agreement held illegal on remand in In re Terazosin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin 11), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2005));
Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 915.
41. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d 1056.
42. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 35.
43. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1061 n.8.
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In many cases the "payment" comes in the form of a side deal,
i.e., an agreement ancillary to the patent settlement. For example, in
some cases there is an ancillary agreement pursuant to which the
defendant licenses one or more of its products to the patentee." If the
licensing payments exceed the fair market value of the in-licensed
technology, one may infer that the excess amount represents a
camouflaged payment for delayed generic market entry. One
agreement at issue in Schering-Plough, for example, involved a
payment of $60 million45 that Schering agreed to make in exchange
for the right to market several of the generic company's proprietary
drug products.46 The FTC went to great lengths in an attempt to
establish that the size of Schering's payment exceeded its actual
valuation of the in-licensed drug products.47 On appeal, however, the
court rejected the FTC's conclusion that the terms of the ancillary
agreements were anything but the product of legitimate arm's-length
business negotiations.48
There are potential pro-competitive aspects to ancillary
agreements such as those entered into by the parties in Schering-
Plough, which might explain the hostility with which the court
responded to the FTC's ex post attack on the legitimacy of the terms
of the agreements. 49 For example, the licensing of the products to the
branded drug company could facilitate their commercialization,
fostering competition in the ancillary drug market. To the extent the
ancillary agreements were legitimate business deals, the Schering-
Plough agreements were effectively cross-licensing agreements, a
form of patent licensing that the FTC and courts have found to be
generally pro-competitive.
50
In some cases, reverse "payment" takes the form of an ancillary
agreement pursuant to which the patent owner grants the defendant a
license to sell a drug other than the one that is the subject of the patent
44. See FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 31-32.
45. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1060.
46. Id. at 1059-60.
47. Id. at 1070.
48. The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held the FTC failed to prove that the amount of the
payments exceeded Schering's actual valuation of the in-licensed drug products. The court was
highly critical of the FTC's attempt to second-guess the merits of the parties' business decisions,
noting the policy concerns raised. See infra Section V.F.
49. See infra Section V.F.
50. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27-29 (1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [hereinafter LICENSING GUIDELINES].
[Vol. 23
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dispute. 51 As with the case where the generic company licenses a
product to the patent owner, these agreements can promote
competition in the ancillary market. Of course, to the extent the
payment is less than a legitimate valuation of the product, the license
to sell the other product can function as a disguised payment for delay
in the marketing of the product allegedly covered by the disputed
patent.
Furthermore, in other cases, the reverse "payment" is an
ancillary agreement pursuant to which the patent owner grants the
defendant a license to sell the patented drug, manufactured by the
patent owner, under a generic label.52 This type of agreement has pro-
competitive potential, because this generic labeled product will
typically come at a price lower than the branded drug product.
53
However, the price discount is limited by the terms under which the
branded company supplies the drug to the generic company, and the
drop in price is generally much less than would be expected in the
case of true generic competition.54 Nevertheless, there will generally
be some consumer benefit, at least compared to an alternative where
the patent challenge never occurred, or where the patent owner
ultimately prevails in the litigation.
In some cases, the parties characterize reverse payments as
"saved litigation expenses. ' 55 The FTC and some commentators have
proposed that reverse payments should not raise a presumption of
illegality where the payment is limited to the litigation costs that the
patentee would expect to save by discontinuing the litigation.56 The
rationale is that even a patent owner convinced of the merits of its
patent case might still legitimately settle a nuisance suit by paying the
patent challenger an amount representing the amount of money that
51. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FTC UNDER THE
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003:
SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2006, at 5 (2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/mmact/MMAreport2006.pdf
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS].
52. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006),
petition for cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
53. See, e.g., id. at 222 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
54. For example, in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, the price drop was
reportedly only about 5%, as compared to the 30% to 80% discount typically available where
there is true generic competition. Id.
55. See, e.g, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS, supra note 51, at 4.
56. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 36-37 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(1 th Cir. 2005); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1758; Shapiro, supra note 10, at 394.
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would otherwise be spent on litigation costs. 57 The FTC would also
limit the settlement to no more than $2 million in any event, a
limitation that the Eleventh Circuit found to be arbitrary in Schering-
Plough. 58 One problem with this limitation to saved litigation
expenses is that it neglects the substantial non-litigation expenses
associated with a nuisance patent suit, such as: the drain on company
executive time, the burden of complying with discovery requests, the
impact on company valuation, the general cost of the cloud of
uncertainty created by ongoing litigation, and the potential for the
inadvertent disclosure of proprietary and confidential information that
accompanies any litigation-associated discovery.5 9
In other cases, an alleged reverse payment takes the form of an
ancillary agreement, pursuant to which the generic company receives
payments to co-promote the branded drug company's product.60
Sometimes the co-promoted product is the product at issue in the
litigation; at other times, it is another product.61
In further cases, the reverse payment comes in the form of an
ancillary agreement under which the generic receives compensation
for agreeing to supply the branded drug company with either raw
materials for the manufacture of the brand product or with finished
drug product. 62 In some cases, the compensation to the generic
company consists of an agreement by the brand company not to
launch an authorized generic during the first-filer generic company's
180-day exclusivity period for the product at issue in the litigation.63
Further, in other cases, the payment is actually an agreement on the
part of the brand company to pay the generic up-front payments,
milestones, sales percentages, or development fees for unrelated
products to be developed using the generic company's technology. 64
57. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1758. See also In re Schering-Plough Corp., No.
9297, slip op. at 36-37 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11th Cir. 2005).
58. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075.
59. Eli Lilly's recent experience with Zyprexa illustrates the limited ability of court
protective orders to protect confidential information from public disclosure. Lilly's travails are
described, e.g., at Electronic Frontier Foundation, Eli Lilly Zyprexa Litigation,
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/zyprexa/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
60. SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS, supra note 51, at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 4-5.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id.
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The FTC and commentators have asserted that reverse payment
settlements are rare outside the context of Paragraph IV litigation.
65
The FTC has declined to take a position as to whether reverse
payment settlements would be illegal in other contexts. 66 As discussed
below, there are clearly unique incentives at play in Paragraph IV
litigations that encourage reverse payments.67 Nevertheless, it should
be borne in mind that the fact that few reverse payment settlements
have been identified in other contexts does not necessarily prove that
they are unique to Paragraph IV litigations.
As with most litigation settlements, the terms of patent
settlement agreements are normally confidential, so it is hard to know
how often they might occur outside the pharmaceutical arena. 68
According to the FTC's Generic Drug Study, reverse payment
settlements of Paragraph IV litigations occurred at least as early as
1993, but the FTC did not begin to officially take notice until 1999.6
9
Further, until they subpoenaed these confidential agreements from
companies in 2001, the FTC had no idea how prevalent such
agreements were.7° Since the FTC's scrutiny of reverse payments
settlements has apparently focused solely on agreements between
drug companies, our lack of knowledge of such agreements in other
contexts does not necessarily prove that they do not occur. Of course,
the FTC could use its subpoena powers to access patent litigation
settlement agreements in a non-technologically discriminatory
manner. However, to date, the FTC has not expressed an interest in
such a global survey.
One notable recent example of a non-pharmaceutical reverse
payment settlement occurred in 2004 in the resolution of a trademark
dispute between Microsoft and Lindows.7' Microsoft sued Lindows
for trademark infringement, charging that the mark LINDOWS was
conftsingly similar to Microsoft's well-known WINDOWS
trademark.72 Microsoft stopped pursuing the case aggressively after a
pretrial ruling that would have instructed the jury to consider whether
65. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1751.
66. James C. Burling, Hatch- Waxman Patent Settlements: The Battle for a Benchmark,
20 ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 41, 45-46 (2006).
67. See infra Section IlI.B.
68. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (2007).
69. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 3, 31.
70. Id. at 1-3.
71. Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1397, 1398 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
72. Id.
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"windows" was a generic term before Microsoft introduced software
with that name in 1985. 73 Faced with a real prospect of losing its
mark, Microsoft settled the litigation by making a reverse payment of
a reported $20 million to Lindows in exchange for Lindows agreeing
to exit the market with respect to Microsoft's allegedly infringed
intellectual property.74
The Microsoft-Lindows agreement demonstrates that reverse
payments are rational and do occur outside the pharmaceutical
context. Still, the Microsoft-Lindows settlement did not generate the
kind of antitrust scrutiny reverse payments typically receive when
they occur in the settlement of a Paragraph IV litigation. Of course,
the argument can be made that the injury to consumer welfare is
attenuated in the trademark context; instead of keeping a competing
product off the market, it merely restricts a competitor's ability to use
a trademark derived from an allegedly generic term. However, any
distinction between patent and trademark is best viewed as one of
degree. Consumers clearly have an interest in returning a generic
mark to the public domain. This public interest is at the heart of the
prohibition against granting trademark rights to generic terms, and
misuse of trademark can violate antitrust laws.75
III. SPECIFIC FACTORS PROVIDING INCENTIVES FOR
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE DRUG
INDUSTRY
Whether or not the phenomenon of reverse payment settlements
is truly restricted to Paragraph IV patent challenges, it seems clear
that they are particularly prevalent in this context. The FTC's Generic
Drug Study identified a high percentage of reverse payment
settlements in the period before it began to take a strong enforcement
position against such agreements.7 6 After the FTC began challenging
reverse payment settlements, there was a period where they were rare
73. Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1864 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
74. This involved Lindows changing its legal name to Linspire. See, Joris Evers,
Microsoft, Lindows Make a Deal, PC WORLD, July 19, 2004,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 116947-page, 1 -c,lindowslinspire/article.html.
75. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(7) (2000) (use of a mark to violate antitrust laws is a
defense against an assertion that a trademark is uncontestable).
76. The report found that nine out of twenty final settlements and three out of four
interim settlements involved reverse payments. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at
31, 34.
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or nonexistent. 7 However, the FTC reports that recently reverse
payment settlements have experienced a resurgence, which they
attribute to the refusal of the courts to support the FTC's position that
such payments render patent settlements presumptively illegal.78 This
section discusses some of the specific factors driving the proliferation
of reverse payment settlements in the context of Paragraph IV
litigations.
79
A. Innovative Drugs Have Intrinsically High Social Utility
A fundamental reality driving large reverse payments is the
amount of profits that can be made in the sale of prescription drugs,
particularly "blockbuster" drugs that offer unique and substantial
therapeutic benefit relative to other products on the market.
Consumers and health plans spend over a hundred billion dollars per
year on prescription drugs,8° and high profit margins create a potential
for huge profits for the purveyors of these drugs. However, a branded
drug company's profit margins are to a large extent dependant upon
the market exclusivity provided by patents. 81 When patent protection
ends, generic competition quickly erodes margins and market share,
resulting in precipitous declines in profitability. 82 The high
profitability of branded drugs motivates drug patent owners to take
77. For fiscal year 2004, the FTC reported that none of the fourteen agreements filed
pursuant to the MMA of 2003 contained a reverse payment accompanied by deferred generic
entry. Jon Leibowitz, Comm'r, FTC, Exclusion Payments to Settle Pharmaceutical Patent Cases:
They're B-a-a-a-ck!, Remarks at the Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum on
Pharmaceutical Antitrust 3-4 (Apr. 24, 2006),
http://www.flc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/060424PharmaSpeechACI.pdf
[hereinafter Leibowitz Speech].
78. FTC Commissioner Leibowitz reported that in the six-month period subsequent to the
Second Circuit's rejection of presumptive illegality for reverse payment settlements in In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, "more than two-thirds of approximately ten agreements
between brands and generics included a payment from the brand and an agreement to defer
generic entry." Id. at 5.
79. A number of other commentators have also previously advanced positions
challenging on various grounds the presumption that reverse payment settlements are antitrust
violations. See, e.g., Burling, supra note 66 at 42-43; Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in
Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA.
L. REv. 747, 748-49 (2002); Langenfeld & Li, supra note 33 at 778.
80. In 2002 alone, Americans spent over $160 billion for prescription drugs. FTC
Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2, at 17 n.55 (citing THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 1 (Oct. 2004)). See also id. at 17 n.55
(citing CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, HIGHLIGHTS - NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURES, 2003, at 1 (Jan. 11, 2005)) ("prescription drug spending rose 14.9% in 2002 and
10.7% in 2003").
81. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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extreme measures to maintain and enforce their patent rights. The
large profits also attract the scrutiny of the FTC and Congress, who
would welcome an opportunity to take a bite out of this profitability
for the benefit of patients as well as insurers, employers and the
government, who ultimately bear the majority of the cost of
prescription drugs.
8 4
High profits reflect the relative inelasticity of consumer demand
for patented prescription medications, particularly in the case of a true
blockbuster drug with no reasonably acceptable substitute. 85 In
lobbying for greater drug accessibility and affordability, consumer
and patient advocates commonly point out the plight of seniors living
on a fixed income and forced to decide between buying food or
prescription drugs. 86 Such stories tug at our heartstrings, and rightly
so, but also highlight the extreme value society places on innovative
drugs. Few other cutting-edge, innovative technologies possess
comparable social value; while we appreciate the tremendous
innovations that have occurred in the information and communication
technology sectors, most of us would feel far less sympathy for the
senior forced to choose between food and the latest cell phone
technology or access to high-speed Internet. It is important to remain
cognizant of this high social utility in drug innovation. The patent
system is the primary engine driving the highly risky and expensive
machine that is modem drug development. 87 Any attempts to restrict
the rights of pharmaceutical patent owners should only be undertaken
while bearing in mind the potential harm to incentives for innovation,
and ultimately the impact this might have on the next generation of
innovative drugs.
The introduction of generic competition dramatically reduces the
profitability of a prescription drug.88 According to FDA, analysis of
83. See infra Section V.
84. See infra Sections IV, VI.B.
85. See Merril Hirsh, Partner, Ross, Dixon, and Bell LLP, Paying Off Generics to Prevent
Competition with Brand Name Drugs, Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print testimony.cfm?id=2472&wit-id=5983.
86. About.com: Senior Health, Prescription Drug Costs,
http://seniorhealth.about.com/cs/prescriptiondrugs/a/drug_cost.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007)
("For some it has become a choice between buying drugs or buying food.").
87. See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1
(Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1991).
88. FDA, Generic Competition and Drug Prices,
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/ogd/genericcompetition.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
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retail data shows that the price of a generic drug averages 94%
percent of the brand price when there is one generic competitor on the
market, and that the entry of a second generic competitor reduces
prices to 52% of brand price. 89 For products that attract a large
number of generic competitors, the average branded price can drop to
20% of the branded price or lower.90 A study by the Congressional
Budget Office ("CBO") that looked at twenty-one drugs that first
encountered generic competition between 1991 and 1993 came to a
similar conclusion.9' After one year, these drugs had lost an average
of 44% of sales revenue, and 42.8% of prescriptions, from drugs
dispensed through pharmacies to their generic counterparts. 92 The
CBO study also found that the retail price of the generic drugs was
25% less than that of the brand-name drugs, on average. 93 It follows
that the existence of reverse payments, and their sizeable magnitude,
can in large part be attributed to the branded and generic companies'
exposure to enormous potential financial losses and gains,
respectively, should the patent challenge succeed.
B. Barriers to Generic Market Entry
Substantial barriers to market entry confront potential generic
drug competitors, and these barriers tend to incentivize reverse
payments settlements. This section discusses specific regulatory
provisions that interact with the drug development process to create
barriers to entry that are unique to the drug industry. It also discusses
the relationship between entry barriers and the anticompetitive
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 28 & n.49 (1998)
[hereinafter CBO REPORT], available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.
92. Id. See also Caves et al., supra note 87, at 36 (finding the price of the first generic
producer is about 40% below the pre-patent expiration branded price of the drug); Richard G.
Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 89 (1997) ("The substantial shift in market share from brand-name to
generic producers (40%-50%) along with the significantly reduced price of generic substitutes
(25%-30% lower) means that the average price of a prescription for a compound subject to
generic competition has fallen."); Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty,
Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON.
331, 335 (1992) ("The general pattern is that generic products enter at a significant discount to
the pioneering product [and]... the prices of the pioneering brands remain higher than their
generic competitors and actually increase in nominal terms .... [T]he average market price
[weighted by sales of the brand and generic] declined by a little more than 10 percent per year in
the first two years after generic entry.").
93. CBO REPORT, supra note 91, at 28.
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potential of reverse payments settlements. It is shown that a
consideration of barriers to market entry, and the source of these
barriers, is critical in any assessment of the anticompetitive potential
of a specific agreement, as well as reverse payment settlements in
general.
1. The Relevance of Entry Barriers to Anticompetitive
Potential
Fundamentally, reverse payments are motivated by a desire on
the part of the patent owner to preclude generic competition by means
of a privately negotiated agreement, rather than relying on
enforcement of the patent in courts. In general, a branded drug
company attempting to maintain market exclusivity by paying a
potential generic competitor to stay off the market will be successful
only to the extent it can also keep third party generic competitors off
the market. 94 This is where barriers to third party generic entry
become so critical. In the absence of such barriers, and in the wake of
a reverse payment settlement, the branded company would be
expected to experience a parade of subsequent third party generic
companies challenging the patent and threatening to enter the market.
Eventually, the cost of paying off all the potential competitors would
outstrip the profits of even the most lucrative blockbuster drug. On
the other hand, if there are high barriers preventing, or at least
significantly delaying third party market entry, then an agreement to
pay a single potential competitor to stay off the market can effectively
exclude any generic competition, rendering the strategy highly
attractive to the branded drug company and correspondingly raising
anticompetitive concerns.
95
Many of the proposed rationales that would support treating
reverse payment settlements as presumptively illegal are based on an
apparent assumption that barriers to third party generic entry are high,
or at times even insurmountable in the context of a Paragraph IV
94. The term "third party generic competitors" and "third party market entry" refers to
generic competitors other than the party to the reverse payment settlement.
95. The fact that antitrust law treats such horizontal market allocation agreements as per
se illegal, in the absence of a patent, can be justified by the logical inference that the existence
of the payment infers sufficient barriers to third party entry to make the payment rational.
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litigation.96 For example, the FTC argued in a brief seeking a denial
of certiorari in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation that:
A variety of factors unique to the pharmaceutical industry,
including the effects of state laws and various policies of health
care institutions that accelerate and magnify the economic impact
of generic entry and the contours of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory
scheme, have created incentives for the use of reverse payment
provisions in pharmaceutical patent litigation. For example,
reverse payment settlements may be attractive to the patentee in
this context because they may forestall entry not only by the
alleged infringer, but by other generic firms as well.
9 7
Arguments made by others advocating a rule of presumptive
illegality for reverse payment settlements also tend to assume
unusually high, or even insurmountable, barriers to third party generic
entry. For example, Hovenkamp et al. state that the appearance of
reverse payments settlements in Paragraph IV disputes is
"[u]ndoubtedly [due to]... the fact-unique to pharmaceutical
patents-that a properly defined settlement-plus-exit-payment keeps
not only the immediate infringement defendant out of the market for a
time, but also keeps other generic firms from entering as well."99
These scholars go on to assert that by making reverse payments
pharmaceutical patentees are able to achieve "a guaranteed insulation
from competition, without the risk that the patent [will be] held
invalid." 100 Of course, these conclusions rest on an implicit
assumption of unusual barriers to third party generic entry in the
context of Hatch-Waxman patent challenges.
Underscoring this assumption, in the same article, Hovenkamp et
al. discuss patent settlement agreements pursuant to which the patent
owner grants the alleged infringer a license to practice the patented
invention. 0 1 While acknowledging that such an agreement has the
potential to create cartel conditions, they conclude nonetheless that
the agreement poses "reasonably small" antitrust risks because "[i]f
the patent is invalid, then the agreement does not necessarily exclude
96. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Andrx
Pharms., Inc., v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004) (No. 03-779), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/6invit/2003-0779.pet.ami.inv.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Brief Opposing Grant of Certiorari in Cardizem].
97. Id. at 16 (citing Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1757)
98. See, e.g., Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10.
99. Id. at 1757.
100. Id. at 1761-62.
101. Id. at 1743.
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anyone, for others will be able to challenge the patent as well."'10 2
Bear in mind that the creation of a price-restricting cartel would
clearly be anticompetitive, and, in the absence of a patent, normally
treated as per se illegal. These scholars' divergent assessment of the
inherent antitrust risks of the two types of agreements appears to be
based primarily on an assumed difference in barriers to third party
generic entry. It might be worth considering whether the focus on
reverse payments is to some extent misplaced; perhaps it is barriers to
third party generic entry unique to the settlement of Paragraph IV
litigations that should be the real concern.
10 3
A number of courts have explicitly considered the role of third
party barriers to entry in assessing antitrust challenges to reverse
payment settlements. 10 4 In contrast to the FTC and many scholars, the
courts who have explicitly considered the issue have tended to assume
relatively low, or at least not unusually high, barriers to third party
generic entry. 10 5 These courts tend to conclude that reverse payments
do not necessarily raise substantial anticompetitive concerns because
they do not prevent third party generic competition. 10 6 In fact, some
courts have gone so far as to find that reverse payment settlements
can be pro-competitive, in that they have the potential to reduce
barriers to third party entry and clear the field for third party generic
competitors.
107
To a large extent, barriers to third party generic entry in the wake
of a Paragraph IV settlement arise out of the regulatory framework
governing generic drug development and marketing. 108
Pharmaceutical regulations tend to not only bolster the exclusionary
power of patents, but also to impose substantial barriers to third party
market entry. 0 9 This includes the potential for Paragraph IV litigants
to arrive at settlement terms that effectively preclude market entry by
any generic competitor.' 1 Before delving into the specifics, it will be
useful to review some pertinent aspects of the regulatory regime
governing the development and marketing of drugs, focusing
particularly on generics.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. See infra Section VII.
104. See infra Section V.H.
105. See infra Section V.11.
106. See infra Section V.H.
107. See infra Section V.H.
108. See infra Section III.B.2-3.
109. See infra Section III.B.2-3.
110. See infra Section III.B.2-3.
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2. The Regulatory Framework Governing Generic Market
Entry
In the United States, the development and marketing of human
drugs is primarily governed by the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act
("FDCA"). 111 Since 1962, the FDCA has required the sponsor of a
new drug to provide "substantial evidence" of both safety and
efficacy as a prerequisite to marketing the drug.1" 2 The mechanism
for gaining approval entails filing a new drug application ("NDA")
with FDA, containing, inter alia, extensive data demonstrating safety
and efficacy; only after FDA approves the NDA is it legal to market
the drug.' 1 3 The cost of filing and obtaining approval of an NDA is
enormous; it is generally estimated that it costs on average $800
million to bring each new drug to market, and much of this can be
attributed to compliance with pre-marketing approval processes. 114
Much of the expense arises from the need to conduct extensive
clinical trials with human subjects, a process that is inherently
expensive, but necessary to establish the required "substantial
evidence" of safety and efficacy.' 15
The primary objective of the safety and efficacy requirement is
consumer protection." 6 However, because of the high costs and the
substantial time and risk of failure associated with securing NDA
approval, compliance with the safety and efficacy requirement
represents a substantial barrier to market entry. 17 This barrier
particularly impacts would-be generic competitors, who, prior to
1984, were required to comply with the same NDA requirements as
the innovator drug company that first developed and brought the drug
111. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000 & Supp. III 2005)). For a comprehensive
review of the FDCA and the drug approval process, see BLANCHARD RANDALL IV, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S. DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS: A PRIMER (2001), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL30989.pdf.
112. Drug Amendment Acts of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781
(1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000)).
113. See2l U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
114. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The
accuracy of the oft-quoted $800 million figure has been challenged by some critics of the
pharmaceutical industry. See, e.g., MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH
BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS 237-46 (2004).
115. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2006), petition
for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
116. See Elissa Levy, The Health Act's FDA Defense to Punitive Damages: A Gift to Drug
Makers or to the Public?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2433 n.48 (2006).
117. Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval and the FDA New Drug
Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 295, 300 (2000).
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to market. 118 At that time, FDA estimated that there were
approximately 150 brand-name drugs whose patents had expired but
for which there was no generic equivalent, and this deficiency was
attributed in large part to the high cost of securing NDA approval for
the generic. 9
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act, better known as the "Hatch-Waxman Act," for
the express purpose of facilitating generic competition in the
prescription drug industry. 120 Hatch-Waxman amended the FDCA in
multiple ways intended primarily to lower the entry barriers to generic
competition, based on the rationale that increased competition and
market forces would drive down drug price. 121 Overall, the legislation
was highly successful, as demonstrated by the large number of
generic drugs that became available subsequent to the legislation and
the well-documented correlation between generic entry and price
reductions. 1
22
One way in which Hatch-Waxman effectively lowered the
barrier to generic entry was by providing the Abbreviated New Drug
Application, or ANDA, as an alternative to the traditional NDA.
123
The ANDA route to pre-marketing approval essentially allows a
generic company to free ride on much of the costs incurred by the
branded drug company in obtaining approval of the original NDA.
Under the ANDA process, a generic manufacturer can obtain
approval by demonstrating that the proposed generic product (1)
contains the same active ingredient as, and (2) is "bioequivalent" to,
the branded drug. 124 Significantly, the ANDA filer can rely on the
118. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 3-4.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16-17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2649-50.
120. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000 & Supp. III 2005)).
For a general overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and FDA regulations implementing it, see
FTC GENERIc DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 3-8.
121. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389 (1999).
122. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at i ("Beyond any doubt, Hatch-Waxman
has increased generic drug entry.").
123. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2000 & Supp. I1 2005).
124. 21 U.S.C. § 355(0)(2)(A)(iv) (2000). There are other requirements - as with an NDA
application, the ANDA must also include:
(B) a full list of the articles used as components of such drug; (C) a full statement
of the composition of such drug; (D) a full description of the methods used in,
and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing
of such drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the articles used as
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data submitted by the innovator in the original NDA to establish the
requisite reasonable evidence of drug safety and efficacy, thereby
avoiding, for example, the expense of conducting redundant human
clinical trials.125 In practice, this allows the generic company to obtain
marketing approval at a fraction of the cost incurred by the innovator
company. Commentators acknowledged that the substantial reduction
of this entry barrier has led to a pronounced expansion of the generic
drug market. 126 According to the CBO, in 1994 alone, Hatch-Waxman
resulted in consumer savings of $8-10 billion on retail prescription
drug purchases. 1
27
The role of patents also figures prominently in Hatch-Waxman
reforms, and understandably so, since they can represent the most
formidable barrier to the entry of generic competition.128 Some period
of marketing exclusivity for innovator drug companies is clearly
desirable, as a mechanism for recouping the sizable investment
required to bring a new drug to market, and to acknowledge the
inherent risk involved in drug development. 129 Hatch-Waxman
reflects this concern, by providing a number of statutory provisions
that specifically bolster the patent rights of innovator drug
components thereof as the Secretary may require; and (F) specimens of the
labeling proposed to be used for such drug.
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vi) (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)).
125. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 3 1, at 5.
126. For example, a CBO study reported that for thirteen major drugs with patents expiring
between 1990 and 1993, eleven had generic entry within two months of patent expiration.
DAVID REIFFEN & MICHAEL R. WARD, GENERIC DRUG INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 6 (2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/industrydynamicsreiffenwp.pdf. In contrast, a study of pre-
Hatch-Waxman entry (between 1976 and 1982) found that only two of the top thirteen drugs had
generic entry within one year of patent expiration. Id.
127. CBO REPORT, supra note 91, 13.
128. For a comprehensive description of the patent-related provisions of Hatch-Waxman,
see WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT LAW AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE
COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 ("THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT")
(2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL3075601102005.pdf.
129. There are many risks associated with drug development. Only a fraction of promising
drug leads prove to have the requisite safety and efficacy in clinical trials; the rest are
abandoned along with the investment made prior to clinical trials. Even safe and effective drugs
are not always commercially successful for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, successful drugs
are sometimes found to have substantial adverse side effects, in many times years after market
entry, resulting in potentially huge product liability, as recently seen with the COX-2 inhibitor
Vioxx. See, e.g., Press Release, Merck, Vioxx Trial Update: Statement on Vioxx Product
Liability Trial Scheduled in Starr County, Texas (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press releases/corporate/2006_0110.html.
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companies. 130 One example is a patent term extension provision,
which allows pharmaceutical patent owners to obtain substantial
extensions of their patent term to compensate for time spent obtaining
FDA approval for the drug.
13 1
At the same time, patents delay generic competition and
facilitate supra-competitive pricing, so it is important to ensure that
drug innovators do not improperly extend their term of patent
exclusivity, for example by means of invalid patents or patents whose
scope does not encompass any or all potential generic variants of a
branded drug. 132 Hatch-Waxman addresses this concern by provisions
that limit the rights of pharmaceutical patent owners and promote
challenges of patent validity and scope of coverage. 133 For example,
while on the one hand Hatch-Waxman extends patent terms for
innovator drug companies to compensate for delays in FDA approval
process, it also creates a statutory research exemption allowing
generic drug manufacturers to complete studies necessary to achieve
FDA approval prior to patent expiration without incurring liability for
patent infringement.' 
34
When considering the issue of reverse payments settlements, the
most relevant patent-related provisions of Hatch-Waxman relate to
the listing of patents in an FDA publication commonly referred to as
the Orange Book. 135 Hatch-Waxman requires an NDA filer to list
certain patents relating to the drug in the Orange Book: particularly
all patents covering the drug's active ingredient, patents on specific
formulations or compositions of the drug, and patents covering the
methods of using the drug.136 A number of important consequences
130. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
131. Id.
132. For example, a patent covering a particular formulation of a drug, but not the active
ingredient per se, might not cover all potential bioequivalent generic versions of the drug. See,
e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 902-03 (6th Cir. 2003).
133. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Merck KGaA
v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). The creation of this research exception by
statute effectively overruled a previous Federal Circuit decision holding that the common law
research use exception does not apply to activities associated with obtaining regulatory
clearance for a patented generic drug. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858
(Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
135. The publication is formally entitled "Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations," and is available at Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA,
Electronic Orange Book Home Page, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).
136. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(e) (2006). Process patents, patents
claiming packaging, patents claiming metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates are not
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flow from the listing of a patent in the Orange Book; some tending to
bolster the rights of the patent owner, and others facilitating
challenges to the listed patent. In the aggregate, they reflect Congress'
intent to balance the interests of branded and generic drug companies
in a manner that benefits consumers. In explaining the competing
policy objectives embodied in Hatch-Waxman, one federal appellate
judge noted that the legislation "emerged from Congress' efforts to
balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-brand
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research
and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to
market.
137
Every ANDA must include a certification for each patent listed
in the Orange Book with respect to the NDA of the drug targeted for
generic competition. 138 The certification for each listed patent must be
one of four types, 139 commonly referred to as the Paragraph I-IV
certifications. In an ANDA containing only Paragraph I, II, and/or III
certifications, the applicant effectively acknowledges the existence of
the listed patents, and agrees not to enter the market until all of the
patents have expired. 140 In this case, FDA will only grant final
approval to the ANDA after all the listed patents have expired.
14
Alternatively, a generic drug company can challenge a listed
patent by making a Paragraph IV certification, whereby the ANDA
applicant asserts that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the generic drug for which the ANDA applicant seeks approval. 42 An
ANDA filer that makes a Paragraph IV certification must provide a
notice to the branded drug company with a detailed statement of the
factual and legal basis for the ANDA filer's assertion that the patent is
invalid or not infringed.
143
Upon receiving notice of a Paragraph IV certification, the
innovator patent owner has two options. One option is to bring an
listed in the Orange Book, and there are restrictions on the listing of polymorph patents and
patents on methods of use. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2006).
137. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting
on other grounds).
138. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2000).
139. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(1)-(IV).
140. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IIl).
141. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
142. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (Supp. 111 2005). Technically, the ANDA filer must provide
notice to both the patent owner and the sponsor of the original NDA; in practice these are
usually the same party, which is the manufacturer of the branded drug.
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immediate, pre-marketing infringement suit against the ANDA
applicant. Under Hatch-Waxman, the mere filing of an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification is an act of constructive infringement,
permitting the patent owner to bring suit as soon as the certification is
filed. 144 If the lawsuit is filed within forty-five days of the patent
holder receiving notice of the Paragraph IV certification, that filing
will invoke an automatic stay of FDA approval of the ANDA,
commonly referred to as the "thirty-month stay." 145 The thirty-month
stay lasts until the earliest of one of the following occurrences: (1) the
expiration of thirty months from the receipt of notice of the Paragraph
IV certification; (2) a final determination of patent invalidity or non-
infringement by a district court; or (3) expiration of the patent. 146
Alternatively, if the patent owner that fails to sue within forty-
five days, the benefit of the thirty-month stay provision is forfeited,
and the generic challenger is free to market the drug upon FDA
approval of the ANDA. 147 Upon generic market entry, the patent
owner remains free to sue the generic company in a standard patent
infringement action.
148
Note that the thirty-month stay provision provides for essentially
the equivalent of an automatic preliminary injunction, without
requiring the patent owner to demonstrate any degree of likelihood of
success on the merits or any of the other criteria normally required of
a patent owner moving for preliminary injunction. 149 Furthermore,
there is no requirement that the patentee post any sort of bond to
cover the defendant's losses for the time enjoined, payable in the
event the defendant ultimately prevails. "0 The thirty-month stay
144. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Some courts have referred to this as an "artificial" form of
patent infringement. See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d
187, 192 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No.
06-830).
146. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
147. Id.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
149. In order for a patent owner to succeed in a motion for preliminary injunction, it
normally must establish: "(1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
harm if an injunction is not granted; (3) a balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the
injunction's favorable impact on the public interest." See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
150. This is generally a requirement when an actual preliminary injunction is granted, and
in the case of a blockbuster drug the size of the bond could be substantial. For example, a
district court recently required a $400 million bond of a branded drug company as a condition
for entering a preliminary injunction to stop the sale of generic Plavix while the case was being
litigated. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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provision confers a substantial benefit on the patent owner, for it
provides an absolute, although time-limited, right to exclude a
competitor from the market, regardless of the likelihood that the
marketing of the generic product would actually infringe a valid
patent.
Orange Book listing effectively bolsters the exclusionary power
of a patent. In any other context, a patent represents nothing more
than a right to try to exclude competitors. Actual exclusion will only
occur if a patent owner can convince a court to issue an injunction or
temporary restraining order, which very often does not occur, or,
alternatively, after the patent litigation has concluded in favor of the
patent owner. 151 In contrast, FDA will not grant final marketing
approval for a generic drug under the ANDA process until all listed
patents have expired, unless the generic company makes an
affirmative substantiated certification that the listed patent is invalid
or not infringed. 152 Even then, the generic company is subject to the
automatic thirty-month stay and suit for patent infringement prior to
market entry. 53
At the same time, other provisions of Hatch-Waxman
substantially attenuate the patent rights of branded drug companies,
by essentially placing a bounty on each patent listed in the Orange
Book in order to incentivize patent challenges. 154 In particular, the
first generic applicant to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV
certification is eligible for 180 days of marketing exclusivity, during
which FDA may not approve any subsequent ANDA corresponding
to the same branded product.1 55 Note that this 180 days of generic
exclusivity ("GE") is granted for the mere act of filing a Paragraph IV
certification. 156 In other words, the patent owner is not required to
respond with a lawsuit, nor is the Paragraph IV filer required to
succeed in the challenge. In fact, the first Paragraph IV filer can retain
its GE even if it never succeeds in entering the market prior to patent
expiration, and even if a subsequent Paragraph IV filer does
successfully challenge the patent. 157 The 180-day GE provisions play
151. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1761.
152. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), (j)(5)(B)(ii) (2000).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii) (Supp. 11I 2005).
154. Engelberg, supra note 121, at 391.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Senator Hatch has noted the potential unfairness of awarding GE to the first-filer as
opposed to the first to successfully challenge a patent in court in his comments regarding the
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a prominent role in most reverse payments settlements, and are
discussed in more detail below.
158
The incentives for listing a patent in the Orange Book are
somewhat perverse, in that the benefits to the patent owner are
inversely correlated with the strength of the patent. If the patent is
weak, either because it is likely invalid or would not be infringed by a
generic product, listing is highly advantageous because it provides for
an automatic thirty-month stay, without requiring the patent owner to
convince a court to grant a preliminary injunction based on the merits
of the case. On the other hand, if the patent is strong, the thirty-month
stay is less valuable, because the patent owner could probably
establish the reasonable likelihood of success necessary to secure a
preliminary injunction, to a large extent rendering the thirty-month
stay superfluous. 159 The prospect of GE will incentivize generic
companies to challenge even an apparently strong patent, in view of
the huge potential profits if the Paragraph IV filer succeeds and the
unpredictability of patent litigation. Courts frequently make mistakes,
and every patent challenge represents some potential that a court will
mistakenly invalidate even an objectively strong patent.
3. 180-day Generic Exclusivity Can Delay Third-Party
Market Entry
In the context of Hatch-Waxman, there is one barrier to third
party generic entry that has the potential to dominate over all the
others, and that is the ability of a first Paragraph IV filer, or a "first-
filer," to indefinitely "park" its 180-day exclusivity period. 160 Not
only is this barrier unique to Paragraph IV patent challenges, it is also
potentially insurmountable, because a parked GE can create a
bottleneck in FDA regulatory process preventing the approval of any
third party generic competitor, at least until the expiration of the
challenged patent.
The potential to park GE arises out of the criteria used to trigger
the awarding of GE and the initiation of the GE period. Recall that
patent challenge provisions of the Medicare Reform Bill of 2003, made on December 9, 2003,
the day after President Bush signed the bill into law. 149 CONG. REC. S16104 (2003).
158. See infra Section III.B.3.
159. Of course, no matter how strong the patent, the thirty-month stay can be preferable
over a preliminary injunction. For example, the automatic stay avoids the vagaries of litigation
and the requirement that the patent holder post a bond, which in the case of a prescription drug
would typically amount to a substantial sum. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470
F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
160. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at vii-xi.
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GE is awarded to the first-filer and generally does not commence
until after the first-filer begins marketing a generic version of the
drug, or a decision is reached in a lawsuit filed in response to the
Paragraph IV litigation.' 61 If the parties to a Paragraph IV litigation
reach an agreement pursuant to which the first-filer agrees to delay or
forgo market entry, the 180-day GE period will not begin until after
the patent litigation is decided in the first-filer's favor. 162 If the
agreement is a final settlement, resulting in dismissal of the
infringement action, the 180-day GE period is never triggered; if it
never begins, it can never end. 163 As a consequence, the parties can
agree to "park" the GE indefinitely, creating a bottleneck that will
prevent any third party generic from entering the market, even if that
third party is never sued for patent infringement, or succeeds in
establishing in court that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
164
The legal right of a first-filer to park GE is even more clear-cut
in the case of a partial settlement, where a subsequent generic
challenger cannot even argue that the first-filer has forfeited GE by
agreeing to terminate the litigation.' 65 In this case, GE will not be
triggered until after a final court judgment, and, in light of the often
protracted timeline of patent litigation, this can result in a bottleneck
lasting for years. Importantly, with the partial settlement agreement in
161. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. II1 2005). This characterization of the triggering
events is an oversimplification of extremely complex statutory language. However, it is
sufficient to understand the statutory basis for the potential to park GE. Originally, 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) provided that commencement of the 180-day GE period would be triggered by
either the first commercial marketing of the generic drug by the first-filer, or by a court decision
holding the patent invalid or not infringed. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). Pursuant to
substantial amendments in the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, GE is now only triggered
by first commercial marketing, but success in court can result in forfeiture of the 180-day
exclusivity. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (Supp. III 2005). All of the antitrust challenges to reverse
payment settlements brought so far involve agreements governed by the original version of the
statute. Although the forfeiture provisions introduced by the 2003 amendments were intended to
prevent blocking of GE, they were probably not entirely successful, and the potential to park GE
continues to exist to some extent. This continuing problem of GE parking is addressed by the
FTC in a recent prepared statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Jon Leibowitz,
Comm'r, FTC, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Benefits
of a Legislative Solution, Prepared Statement of the FTC Before the Committee on the Judiciary
of the United States Senate 23-25 (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/070117anticompetitivepatentsettlements senate.pdf
[hereinafter FTC January 2007 Senate Testimony].
162. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 58-60.
163. As least this is how the original version of the provisions was interpreted. Even after
the 2003 amendments, according to my analysis of the statutory language and relevant case law
the same potential exists, although a full explanation would exceed the scope of this paper.
164. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 57.
165. See supra Section II.
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place, there can be less incentive for either party to proceed diligently
in court. This creates an environment ripe for collusive behavior that
protracts the litigation to the benefit of both parties, but at the expense
of third party generic entry and consumers.
The ability to park GE creates a huge incentive for collusive
settlement agreements between branded drug companies and first-filer
generic companies. By effectively creating an insurmountable barrier
to third party generic entry, it allows the settling parties to share in
supracompetitive profits made possible by market exclusivity. 166 In
fact, were it not for fear of antitrust liability, it would probably always
be in the best interest of a branded drug company and the GE owner
to reach such an agreement. The profit margins available under
monopoly conditions generally exceed those available in a market
with two or more competitors, and with only a single potential generic
competitor both parties would be better off sharing those profits than
competing. 167
While agreements to park GE clearly raise anticompetitive
concerns, it is important to bear in mind that there are arguably
legitimate reasons a GE owner would agree to park its GE. For
example, most critics of reverse payment settlements, including, the
FTC, would condone a settlement agreement wherein the only
consideration flowing to the GE owner is a negotiated early entry
date. 168 The patent challenge has worked as intended, providing
consumers with generic competition prior to patent expiration, but the
GE owner will be denied its reward of 180-day exclusivity if it is not
allowed to park its GE until the date of market entry.
As another example, a first generic filer diligently pursuing a
Paragraph IV litigation in court might legitimately desire to retain its
GE until after successfully obtaining a final judgment of invalidity or
non-infringement. A subsequent generic company that has obtained
final approval of its ANDA, because it was not sued by the patent
owner, or because it has already prevailed in court, would destroy the
value of GE if it were allowed to enter the market while the first-
filers' litigation is pending. Members of Congress specifically
considered this issue and declined to adopt certain proposed reforms
to the 180-day exclusivity provisions that would have limited the
166. See infra Section IV.A.
167. The incentives for collusive settlements parking GE are described in more detail by
Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1755-62.
168. Id. at 1762. See also Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th
Cong. § 2 (2007).
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ability to park GE, but at the same time would have caused the first-
filer to forfeit its GE under this scenario. 69 Note the fundamental
tension here. It will be very difficult, if not impossible, to amend the
GE provisions of Hatch-Waxman to eliminate the potential for
parking GE without, at the same time, creating situations where first-
filers lose their GE, even in cases where there is no collusion with the
patent owner, or reverse payments.
4. The ANDA Approval Process Acts as a Barrier to
Generic Market Entry
While the relatively streamlined ANDA approval process has
reduced the regulatory burden on generic drug companies, it still
imposes its own substantial monetary and temporal barriers to entry
for third party generic competition. The process typically requires a
would-be generic competitor twelve months and around $1 million
just to generate and compile the data necessary to file an ANDA. 17 ° If
that is the case and the ANDA includes a Paragraph IV certification
that results in an automatic thirty-month stay, a time lag of at least
forty-two months between commencement of approval process and
ability to market the drug can be expected.
Even in cases where the patent owner does not file suit, and thus
the thirty-month stay does not come into play, the time required for
ANDA approval is substantial. In most cases, FDA rejects the initial
ANDA, requiring the applicant to conduct additional tests or submit
additional material. 171 The time it takes to secure ANDA approval
varies substantially on a case-by-case basis, reportedly averaging
about nineteen months and in some cases taking much longer, so in
total an ANDA can expect at least two to three years to elapse
between the time it decides to enter a market and actual entry, even in
cases where a patent is not asserted. 172 Approval can in some cases
take much longer; it is not uncommon for a Paragraph IV filer not to
receive final approval until well after expiration of the thirty-month
stay. 173
169. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Scheme on
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 228-29 (2005).
170. For example, an approved source of materials and adequate production facilities are
required at the time of the application. See REIFFEN & WARD, supra note 126, at 6-7.
171. Id. at 6. A typical approved applicant has gone through two or three resubmissions
before it obtains approval. Id.
172. Id. at 6-7.
173. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(relating how approval of an ANDA for the generic form of Plavix took over four years).
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The cost barrier to entry for filing the ANDA is probably not too
much of a factor, when one considers the profits available to the
generic manufacturer, even without the benefit of GE. If a generic
company can at least be one of the first generics on the market, they
stand to earn substantial returns, particularly in view of the first
mover advantages seen to accrue to the first generic filers. 74 Even in
a market with a substantial number of generic competitors, generic
drug companies are believed to earn profits exceeding the average
cost-the expected return in a hypothetical truly competitive
market. 175
However, the regulatory burden can impose a substantial
temporal barrier to entry. Although a reverse payment settlement can
leave third party generic companies free to enter the market, it will
take them at least several years to obtain marketing clearance from
FDA, unless they have already started the process prior to the
settlement.176 For a blockbuster drug with annual sales in the billions
of dollars, even a few years of market exclusivity would be extremely
valuable and highly incentivize substantial reverse payments to one or
a few generic companies that are well along in the approval process.
On the other hand, one can imagine a scenario where multiple
third party generic companies have filed ANDAs with Paragraph IV
certifications shortly after the first-filer. Depending upon how these
third parties are faring in the approval process, they might represent
viable generic competition, reducing the potential for a reverse
payment settlement between the patent owner and a single generic
company to restrict all generic competition. Since the regulatory
burden is primarily temporal, as opposed to fiscal, the anticompetitive
potential of the agreement depends to a large extent on the number of
other generic companies seeking ANDA approval at the time of the
agreement and their status in the approval process. This fact is
normally not explicitly addressed in analyzing the legality of reverse
payment settlements, but should be a relevant consideration in
assessing the potential for anticompetitive harm.
In practice, the first scenario where there are no other generic
competitors seeking ANDA approval at the time of the settlement
agreement seems unlikely, at least in the case of blockbuster drugs,
which are the primary concern of the FTC and other critics of reverse
payment settlements. Highly profitable drugs with tremendous
174. REIFFEN & WARD, supra note 126, at 7 n.7.
175. Id. at 3-4.
176. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
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therapeutic utility should and do generally attract multiple generic
challengers. 177 Under this dynamic, settlement with one generic
company will not necessarily prevent the other generics from
obtaining regulatory approval and entering the market, at least
without parking GE.
5. Drug Patents Can Be Difficult to Design Around
Another way in which drug regulation encourages reverse
payment settlements of Paragraph IV litigation is by bolstering the
effective exclusionary potential of drug patents. To understand this
effect, it is useful to consider a hypothetical non-regulated drug
market, with consumers directly selecting and paying for their drugs.
In a non-regulated environment where price and output decisions are
driven by market factors, drug companies would face fewer
constraints in designing around a rival's patent. While designing
around is generally a legitimate means for circumventing a
competitor's patent, it is often difficult to accomplish in the context of
prescription drugs. 1
78
Imagine that Company A markets a patented and branded drug,
and Company B designs around the patent by developing a drug with
essentially equivalent pharmacologic properties but containing an
active ingredient with a different chemical structure. Even if the
difference in structure is trivial and the resulting effect on function
insignificant, if the patent is avoided, then Company B has succeeded
in designing around the patent and should be able to compete directly
in the market. 1
79
However, in the real world, strict regulatory controls make it
significantly more difficult for a Company B to successfully design
around an Orange Book-listed patent. If the design around process
involves any change to the chemical structure of the active ingredient
of the drug or results in a product that is not bioequivalent to the
original patented product, Company B will generally not be able take
advantage of the ANDA process.18 0 Instead, it will be required to go
through the full-blown NDA process, resulting in a drastic increase in
the time and expense required to secure marketing approval. This, in
177. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, which attracted three
subsequent generic challengers, and Schering-Plough, where there were two ANDA filers, both
discussed infra Section V.A. This pattern of multiple ANDA filers is typical.
178. See infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
179. This is assuming that consumers are only interested in the branded drug's function
and will find the two products to be close substitutes for one another.
180. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000).
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part, explains why generic companies expend so much energy
challenging patents, rather than attempting to design around them.
That is not to say that drug companies are unable to design around
patents. Drug companies are often quite successful in designing
around fornulation patents, which do not cover the active ingredient
per se. 181 However, drug companies' efforts are still severely limited
by the fact that any design around involving an alteration of the
structure of the active ingredient or lack of bioequivalence will
preclude marketing approval by means of an ANDA.
The various rules restricting the ability of pharmacies to make
substitutions for prescribed drugs impose another impediment to
designing around pharmaceutical patents. If consumers were free to
purchase any drug they liked, and if they paid for their drugs directly,
they might be induced to purchase Company B's alternate, but
technically not "generic," product. This is true, particularly if it were
priced less than Company B's branded drug, since the two drugs are
close functional substitutes. However, in the case of prescription
drugs, consumers are normally unable to do this. Pharmacies are only
permitted to substitute what are referred to as "AB-rated drugs,"
essentially generic versions of the prescribed drug that would qualify
under the ANDA process. 182 They are not allowed to substitute
functional equivalents, even if requested by the patient, unless the
substitute is an AB-rated generic. 183 Since the active ingredient in
Company B's design-around is different from that in Company A's
branded product, substitution by the pharmacy would not be allowed.
Also, because patients generally do not pay for drugs out of their own
pockets, there is little incentive to research the options and request
their doctors to prescribe the less expensive, but functionally
equivalent, product. This inertia is reinforced by the substantial
marketing efforts typically associated with branded drugs.' 
84
181. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 902-03 (6th Cir.
2003), for a case where a generic company apparently successfully designed around a
formulation patent but was still able to take advantage of ANDA process.
182. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 415 (D. Del.
2006).
183. See, e.g., id.
184. The FTC recently noted that a competing drug that is not bioequivalent to a branded
drug is unlikely to have a significant impact on the market for the branded drug. Complaint 15,
In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293 (F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm.
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6. Litigation Risk and Upside Potential Are Reallocated in
Paragraph IV Patent Challenges
Another way in which the provisions of Hatch-Waxman promote
reverse payment settlements is by effectively reallocating the
potential upside pay off and downside risk between parties to a
Paragraph IV litigation, relative to the situation in a more
conventional patent litigation. Normally, a patent infringement suit is
filed subsequent to substantial commercial and allegedly infringing
activities.' 85 Often these activities continue through the course of the
litigation, and settlement might not occur until years after the initial
filing of the suit. 186 As a consequence, the alleged infringer is
typically exposed to a risk of potentially large damages if it loses the
lawsuit, so large that they might far exceed any profits attributable to
the infringement. The upside potential for the alleged infringer should
it prevail in the litigation, on the other hand, is typically limited to the
right to continue its pre-litigation activities that resulted in the
lawsuit.
The patent owner in a conventional patent litigation often stands
to reap a windfall in damages if successful in the litigation. "'
Conversely, the downside potential, should the patent owner lose, is
essentially maintenance of the status quo. The defendant is free to
continue what were alleged to be infringing activities, just as it would
have if the patentee had simply decided not to enforce its patent.
In contrast, the relative allocation of risk and upside potential is
substantially redistributed in a Paragraph IV litigation. Paragraph IV
lawsuits are generally filed long before the proposed generic product
has even received marketing approval, and hence before any damages
have accrued. 188 Under Hatch-Waxman, the only remedy available to
a Paragraph IV plaintiff is an injunction, provided the generic
company has not commercialized the drug.'
89
Furthermore, because of the unique economics of the
prescription drug market, driven in large part by the dominance of
185. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006). See also Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Engin'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,
1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (noting that de minimis infringement will result
in only de minimis damages, thereby reducing the incentive to bring suits for non-commercial
infringement).
186. Often after a critical judicial ruling, or on the eve of trial.
187. It might also benefit from the strengthening of its patent by the court's affirmation of
the patent's validity and scope.
188. See supra Section III.B.2 and infra Section V.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2000).
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government and other third party payers and the importance of
favorable formulary listings, even a brief period of marketing a
generic drug can result in irreversible damage to the market for the
branded product.1 90 Even if the patent owner ultimately prevails in the
litigation, chances are high that it will not be fully compensated by
court-ordered damages. 191 The patent owner's losses would be
expected to far exceed the generic company's profits resulting from
the infringement, and might outstrip the assets of a modest-sized
generic company.1 92 Although the patent owner's losses might be very
real, proving them with sufficient rigor to justify an award of lost
profits might require sophisticated economic arguments that a court
might not understand, or find too speculative to serve as the basis for
an award of huge money damages. 193
The patent owner in a Paragraph IV litigation faces enormous
downside potential. As discussed above, the exclusionary potential of
a pharmaceutical patent can substantially exceed that of a typical
patent, because it allows for an automatic thirty-month stay and
because of the practical difficulty in designing around such patents.
194
It follows that the invalidation of a pharmaceutical patent will tend to
be more devastating to the interests of the patent owner than the
invalidation of a patent in another technology sector.
Compounding patent owner risk is the fact that it only takes one
successful patent challenge to invalidate a patent, and that it is not
uncommon for multiple generic companies to challenge a single
patent.195 For example, in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,
the first Paragraph IV filer was successful at the district court level in
having the patent declared invalid and unenforceable under a variety
of theories including inequitable conduct.' 96 The case was appealed,
but the parties settled prior to the Federal Circuit deciding the
190. See, e.g., Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
191. Langenfeld & Li, supra note 33, at 792.
192. The FTC expressly recognized the risk to branded drug companies posed by
judgment-proof generic companies that have lost a Paragraph IV litigation after "at risk" market
entry. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 38 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf,
vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005).
193. See, e.g., Bic Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1220 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) ("[T]he documentary and testimonial evidence on price erosion [was] too speculative
to support an award of price erosion lost profits.").
194. See supra Section III.B.2, B.5.
195. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006),
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
196. Id. at 193.
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appeal. 197 Subsequent to the settlement, three other generic companies
filed Paragraph IV certifications and litigated the validity and
enforceability of the patent, but all three subsequent court challenges
were unsuccessful.1 98 Thus, three out of the four courts to consider the
charge of inequitable conduct rejected it, but, without the settlement,
a single outlier decision could have rendered an otherwise valid patent
unenforceable.
Consider how the case might have played out if the patent holder
was not able to settle the litigation after the first adverse district court
decision. The standard of review for the district court's ruling of
inequitable conduct is quite deferential, with reversal appropriate only
where the district court is found to have committed clear error.
1 99
Given this deferential standard of review, it seems plausible that the
Federal Circuit might have upheld the district court's decision even if
it was objectively weak on the merits. The risk of a flawed court
decision destroying an objectively valid patent is present in any
litigation, and is one explanation for a patent owner making
substantial reverse payments to settle in cases where it feels it should
prevail on the merits.2 °0
Even a patent owner confident in the legitimacy of its patent
rights might nonetheless find itself in a compromised position in a
particular litigation, either because of an error in litigation strategy, an
unfavorable ruling, or perhaps a hostile court. The patent owner will
have a strong incentive to settle that particular case, even making
substantial reverse payments in order to foreclose the possibility of an
anomalous adverse ruling improperly destroying its valuable patent.
The same patent owner might decide to litigate another parallel
litigation to completion, where the circumstances of that particular
litigation appear more favorable to upholding the patent. This appears
to be what occurred in Tamoxifen. 20 1
The alleged infringer in a Paragraph IV litigation, on the other
hand, faces a huge upside potential, should it prevail. If it was a first-
197. Id. at 193-94.
198. Id. at 194-95.
199. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The ultimate determination of inequitable conduct is therefore a matter
'committed to the discretion of the trial court' and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.")
(citation omitted).
200. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11 th Cir.
2003).
201. See infra Section V.A. See also FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 35
(noting the settlement rate with second generic applicants is much lower than with first generic
applicants).
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filer, it will have a minimum of 180-days of generic exclusivity, an
extremely lucrative market position, particularly in light of the
documented first mover advantage accruing to the first generic market
entrant.2 °2
Consider the effect of this redistribution of risk and upside
potential on incentives to settle. In the case of a conventional patent
infringement suit, even a defendant reasonably confident in ultimately
prevailing in the litigation might decide to liquidate its risk of
potentially large damages by agreeing to pay the patentee some
percentage of the potential damages. Even a defendant perceiving a
20% likelihood of being found liable and estimating a potential of
$100 million damages might rationally decide to settle for $20
million.20 3 By settling, the defendant might even be able to negotiate
an acceptable royalty and continue to practice the patented invention.
On the other hand, if the litigation continues and the patentee prevails,
the patentee will more than likely be able to get a permanent
injunction, thereby barring the defendant from the technology for the
remainder of the patent term,20 4 or at least substantially strengthen the
patent owner's bargaining position in any licensing negotiation. The
infringer, being already on the market, will likely find it more costly
to exit the market than a Paragraph IV defendant that has yet to enter
the market.205
Conversely, in a Paragraph IV litigation, the lack of potential
damages and the potentially catastrophic consequences of an adverse
ruling place the patent owner in a relatively weaker position. Even a
patent owner confident in the merits of its case might reasonably
decide to make substantial reverse payments to insure against an
adverse ruling. The patent challenger, on the other hand, having
already sunk the costs of preparing and filing its ANDA and facing no
prospect of money damages, has little incentive to settle in the
202. REIFFEN & WARD, supra note 126, at 7 n.7.
203. Admittedly an overly simplistic example used to illustrate a point. In view of the
apparent high rate of error by courts deciding patent cases, a rational patent owner would
probably never predict more than an 80% probability of success. See, e.g., Alan C. Marco,
Learning by Suing: Structural Estimates of Court Errors in Patent Litigation 17 (Oct. 21, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=913408 (finding that errors wherein a valid patent is
erroneously found to be invalid by a court occur with an estimated probability of 20 to 25%).
204. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840-41 (2006).
205. The expense of filing and gaining approval of the ANDA is a sunk cost, but, even if
the patent challenge is unsuccessful, the investment is not lost. The generic company can still
use the ANDA as the basis for marketing a generic product, albeit at a later date (after the patent
has expired).
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absence of reverse payments. This reversal of risk, to a large extent,
explains the proliferation of such payments in Paragraph IV litigation
settlements. As discussed below, a number of courts have specifically
noted this reallocation of risk and upside potential in Paragraph IV
litigations, and the resulting unique incentive for reverse payments in
the settlement of these cases.2 °6
IV. THE FTC AND REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Over the last ten years, FTC scrutiny of the pharmaceutical
industry has expanded dramatically, driven by a rapid rise in the
nation's expenditure on prescription drugs.2 °7 One area of particular
concern is the potential for anticompetitive settlements of Paragraph
IV patent challenges.2 °8
A. The FTC Originally Focused on Settlement Agreements
That Parked Generic Exclusivity or Covered Noninfringing
Products
The FTC has long been aware of reverse payment settlements,
but until recently the agency did not appear to have been overly
concerned with the anticompetitive implications of reverse payments
209per se. Instead, FTC scrutiny focused primarily on terms in patent
settlement agreements that either had the potential to park the 180-day
GE, or that extended to activities and/or products not covered by the
patent.2 1°
In 1999, the FTC ordered twenty-eight brand name drug
companies and fifty generic companies to submit for review any
agreements the companies had entered into subsequent to December
31, 1994, that related to an ANDA filing, including any full or partial
206. See infra Section V.C.
207. Drug expenditures reported doubled between 1995 and 2000. See Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and Source
of Funds, CY 2005-1960,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/nhe2005.zip (last visited Feb.
28, 2007).
208. See, e.g., FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31.
209. Reverse payment settlement agreement to Paragraph IV litigations is not a new
phenomenon. For example, the FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 31, identifies one
that was executed in March 1993. Note that there were probably reverse payment settlement
agreements prior to this one. The FTC study gathered agreements that were executed after
December 31, 1994, or that were still in force as of the date that information was requested in
2001. Id. at 3, A-22 & n.7.
210. See infra notes 221-229 and accompanying text.
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settlements to patent litigation. 211 The results of this survey were
analyzed and became the basis for a report entitled Generic Drug
Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study ("FTC Generic Drug
Study"), published in July 2002.212 The study provides, inter alia, a
detailed analysis of the agreements and their effect on competition,
along with a variety of specific and general recommendations for
legislative changes to Hatch-Waxman to address competition
concerns identified in the study. Most of the proposed legislative fixes
were intended to curtail anticompetitive gaming of the ANDA
processes, which, in the view of the FTC, at times subverted the
legislation's purpose of promoting generic competition.2 13
The study begins with an "Executive Summary and Legislative
Recommendation" section, which prescribes two primary
recommendations, one having to do with reform to the thirty-month
stay provisions and the other relating to the parking of 180-day GE.214
No recommendations were made with respect to reverse payments
settlements, which were referred to in the study as "brand
payments. ' '215 To the contrary, the section concludes by noting that
Paragraph IV litigation settlements are generally not problematic, so
long as there is no potential for parking GE.2t6
Although the FTC study specifically identifies a number of
agreements with reverse payments, including some of the earliest
Paragraph IV settlements identified in the study,2 17 it never suggests
that reverse payments in and of themselves raise anticompetitive
concerns, or should render an otherwise legitimate agreement
presumptively illegal.2 18 To the contrary, the study makes clear that it
"does not reach any conclusions about the competitive effects of
[settlements involving brand payments]. ' '219
The study does identify four interim settlement agreements as
being particularly suspect, including the agreements which ultimately
211. The special orders were sent out pursuant to section 6(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000); FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 3.
212. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31.
213. Id. at i-xi.
214. The study recommended legislation to prevent branded drug companies from
obtaining multiple thirty-month stays, and also to limit the ability of companies to park GE. Id.
at ii-vi.
215. Id. at i-xi, 17.
216. Id. atviii.
217. At least one of the agreements dates back to 1993. Id. at 31.
218. See id. at 31 (nine out of twenty agreements included reverse payments).
219. Id. at 25.
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reached the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough, and notes that
enforcement actions had been taken against three out of the four
agreements. 220 Incidentally, all of the interim settlement agreements
subject to enforcement action involved reverse payments, but the
study never particularly points to this fact. Instead, the study identifies
as the primary basis for antitrust concern the potential of the
challenged agreements to park GE.22'
The FTC's initial focus on parking GE and other barriers to third
party generic entry, not reverse payments, is also evident in a number
of public statements by FTC commissioners. For example, in a 2000
speech, FTC Commissioner Anthony identified reverse payments as
problematic, but primarily because they facilitate agreements that
park GE, or that otherwise extend beyond the reasonable exclusionary
potential of the patent, for example, by requiring the generic company
to refrain from marketing any form of the generic drug, even forms
not covered by the patent.
222
The FTC's initial concern with GE parking and restrictions
exceeding the exclusionary potential of the patent, as opposed to a
concern with reverse payments per se, is also reflected in its selection
of enforcement targets. The first two reported FTC enforcement
actions to challenge Paragraph IV settlements were brought against
Abbott223 and Hoechst Marion Rousse 224 on March 16, 2000. Both
FTC complaints alleged that the challenged agreements resulted in the
parking of GE.225 They also alleged that the challenged agreements
included products that were not covered by the patent; for example,
the agreement included restrictions exceeding the exclusionary
220. Id. at 25 & n.3. For comparison, note that the study indicates the FTC had only taken
an enforcement action against one out of the twenty final Paragraph IV settlement agreements.
Id. at 25 n.2.
221. Id. at57-58.
222. Sheila F. Anthony, Comm'r, FTC, Riddles and Lessons from the Prescription Drug
Wars: Antitrust Implications of Certain Types of Agreements Involving Intellectual Property,
Remarks Before the Attendee of the ABA "Antitrust and Intellectual Property: The Crossroads"
Program (June 1, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/anthony/sfip00601.htm.
223. FTC, Docket: In re Abbott Laboratories, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3945.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
224. FTC, Docket: In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/d9293.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
225. Complaint 23, 37, In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945 (F.T.C. May 26, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/abbottcmp.htm;
Complaint 16, In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293 (F.T.C. May 11, 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm.
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potential of the patent.22 6 The cases resulted in consent orders in 2000
and 2001, respectively, requiring Abbott and Hoechst Marion Roussel
to refrain from entering any agreement with terms that would require
the generic company to park its GE, or that would require the generic
company to research or market a drug product that is not the subject
227
of the litigation. The companies were also required to refrain from
entering partial settlement agreements involving reverse payment.
2 2 8
Interestingly, there is no requirement that the parties refrain from
reverse payments in a final settlement agreement that would terminate
the litigation. The terms of the consent order suggest that, while the
FTC was opposed to agreements requiring the generic company to
park GE, agreements that extend to products not covered by the
patent, and partial settlement agreements involving reverse payments,
the FTC did not view reverse payments as per se problematic, at least
in the context of a final settlement agreement.
229
The FTC has, on a number of occasions, testified before
Congress regarding the anticompetitive concerns with Paragraph IV
settlement that improperly "game" Hatch-Waxman.230 However, until
recently, this testimony had focused on the potential for the parties to
226. Complaint 26, In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945 (F.T.C. May 26, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/20O0/03/abbottcmp.htm;
Complaint 23, In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293 (F.T.C. May 11, 2001),
http://www.flc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm.
The extension of the Abbott agreement to potentially non-infringing products was also
specifically noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
344 F.3d 1294, 1311-12 (1lth Cir. 2003), a private antitrust action taken against the same
agreement.
227. In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, pt. II (F.T.C. May 26, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/abbott.do.htm;
In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, pt. II (F.T.C. May 11, 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/hoechstdo.htm.
228. In re Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, pt. Ill (F.T.C. May 26, 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/abbott.do.htm;
In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293, pt. III (F.T.C. May 11, 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/05/hoechstdo.htm.
229. It is hard to imagine a reverse payment settlement that does not include reverse
payments. Why should a generic company agree to stay off the market without requiring some
consideration? Of course, the generic company could choose to stay off the market during the
course of the litigation, but why enter into a contract promising to stay off the market without
receiving some consideration?
230. See FTC Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2 at 5; Timothy J. Muris,
Comm'r, FTC, Prepared Statement of the FTC Before the Committee on Judiciary of the United
States Senate (June 17, 2003), http://ftc.gov/os/2003/06/030617pharmtestimony.htm; Robert
Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, Prepared Statement of the FTC Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United
States Senate (Mar. 22, 2000), http://ftc.gov/os/2000/03/antitrusttestimony.htm.
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park GE and thereby block entry of potential third party generic
competition, rather than on the existence of reverse payments per se,
or on theories based on the probabilistic nature of patents or a right of
consumers to the benefit of a litigation maintained to final
judgment.23 '
In a prepared statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on June 17, 2003, Commissioner Muris stressed that all of the early
enforcement actions against reverse payment settlements "alleged that
the brand-name company used the generic company's rights to the
180-day exclusivity under Hatch-Waxman to impede entry by other
generic competitors." 232 Commissioner Muris made a number of
recommendations for congressional action with respect to Hatch-
Waxman, including revisions to the 180-day GE provisions. 233 Many
of these recommendations were adopted in the 2003 Medicare
Modernization Act. 234 For example, the FTC recommended that
brand-name companies and first generic applicants be required to
provide copies of settlement agreements to the FTC and the DOJ.
235
The sole reason identified by Commissioner Muris for requiring this
submission was to allow review of the agreements to "ensure that the
180-day provision is not manipulated in a way to delay entry of
additional generic applicants. 23 6 There was no suggestion that the
review provision was intended to police against reverse payments per
se. Commissioner Muris also urged implementation of the
recommendations for legislative action made in the FTC study, such
as forfeiture provisions to prevent parking of GE - no
recommendations were made regarding reverse payments. 37
B. The FTC's Attention Has Shifted to Reverse Payments
More recently, the FTC has shifted its position on reverse
payment settlements. It has come to equate them with horizontal
market allocation agreements, which are normally per se antitrust
231. See Pitofsky, supra note 230.
232. Muris, supra note 230, pt. III.A.
233. Id. pt. IV.F.
234. See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-62 (2003) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (2000 & Supp. III 2005)).
235. Muffs, supra note 230, pt. IV.F. The suggestion was introduced into law as section
1112 of Subtitle B ("Federal Trade Commission Review") of Title XI of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement and Modernization Act § 1112.
236. Muris, supra note 230, pt. IV.F.
237. Id.
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violations when no patent is involved.238 The FTC advocates a rule
that would essentially find such agreements presumptively illegal,
independent of the existence of GE parking or restrictions extending
beyond the exclusionary potential of the patent.
239
This is in contrast to the position taken by most courts, which
have generally held that an agreement settling a legitimate patent
dispute does not violate the antitrust laws.240 Although an agreement
to stay off the market would be illegal per se in the absence of a
patent, most courts would recognize that a patent provides a
legitimate and independent basis for excluding an alleged infringer,
and that a settlement agreement is legal so long as it does not restrict
competition to an extent exceeding the reasonable exclusionary
potential of the patent.241 Courts tend to point to the fact that patents
are, in a sense, anticompetitive by their very nature, but this is part
and parcel of their ability to incentivize innovation. 242 They also point
to the presumption of validity conferred by statute upon issued
patents.243
In contrast, the FTC evinces considerable skepticism regarding
the presumption of patent validity, and points out that any exemption
from the application of normal antitrust rules to patents settlements
does not apply if the patent is invalid, or does not cover the restricted
activities. 244 The agency points to statistics showing that courts
routinely find asserted patents to be invalid or not infringed, 245
particularly in the case of Paragraph IV patent challenges, and would
238. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (observing that an agreement between
competitors to allocate territories is a "classic example" of a per se violation of the Sherman
Act, with no purpose other than to reduce competition)).
239. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough, the FTC's rule "would make
almost any settlement involving a payment illegal." Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056, 1075 (11 th Cir. 2005) (further noting the FTC's rule was directly contrary to the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Valley Drug), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
240. See infra Section V.
241. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066-67.
242. Id. at 1067.
243. Id. at 1066.
244. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 30 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11 th Cir. 2005). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (No. 05-273), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/08/050829scheringploughpet.pdf [hereinafter FTC Petition for
Certiorari in Schering-Plough].
245. FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 5, 17 (citing FTC
GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 19-20; John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-06 (1998)).
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infer from a patent owner's willingness to make sizeable reverse
payments that it considers its patent case to be weak.2 46 For example,
the FTC in its petition for writ of certiorari in Schering-Plough cites
to a leading treatise of antitrust law for the "fact" that a firm "'certain
that a patent was valid.., would have no incentive whatsoever to pay
another firm to stay out of the market."' 247
The FTC's position relies heavily on a body of scholarly
literature that stresses the uncertainty of patent litigation and the
"probabilistic" nature of patent rights.248 These theories characterize
the patent right as inherently "probabilistic" because of the general
uncertainty with respect to validity and scope of a patent prior to court
decision. 249 As expressed by Hovenkamp et al., a patent is best
viewed not as a right to exclude competition, but more correctly as "a
right to try to exclude competition."
250
The FTC has essentially taken the position that in every
Paragraph IV litigation, consumers have an expectation interest in the
finite probability that the patent challenge will succeed.25' In effect,
the FTC would treat this consumer expectation as a probabilistic
property right. The FTC argues that any settlement between the
parties that deprives consumers of the value of this expectation
interest is a presumptive violation of the antitrust laws.
25 2
The FTC would allow parties to settle by compromising on an
entry date prior to the patent's expiration, without cash payments,
because "the resulting settlement presumably would reflect the
parties' own assessment of the strength of the patent., 253 The FTC
views these agreements as neutral, or even pro-competitive, since
they resolve the uncertainty of the litigation early and provide some
guaranteed benefit to consumers in proportion to the probability that
the patent challenge would succeed.254 The FTC would generally find
246. FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 17. A patent might
be weak if likely to found invalid or unenforceable, or if the claims would likely be construed so
as to not cover the proposed generic product.
247. See Id. at 18 (quoting 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 2046, at 339
(Supp. 2004)).
248. Id. at 16 (citing Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1761; Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Probablistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75 (2005); Shapiro, supra note 10, at
395).
249. ld. at 16-17.
250. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10, at 1761.
251. See FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 17-18.
252. See id. at 19.
253. Id. at 18.
254. Id.
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any reverse payment settlement anticompetitive, because it fails to
provide as much consumer benefit as what it considers to be the
"benchmark" agreement with a negotiated early entry date and no
payments to the patent challenger.255 The FTC would infer that any
payment is a quid pro quo for delayed generic entry, and that were it
not for the payment the parties would have either settled on an earlier
entry date, or not settled and litigated the case to completion--either
scenario benefiting consumers relative to the reverse payment
settlement.256 Note that under the FTC's approach, essentially any
reverse payment settlement will be found illegal, regardless of the
strength or weakness of the patent case. This is consistent with the
FTC's position that an inquiry into the merits of the underlying patent
case is inappropriate, except in cases of an objectively baseless or
sham patent suit.
257
While the FTC considers an inquiry into the merits of the
underlying patent dispute generally unwise and unwarranted in
assessing antitrust liability, it clearly has no such reticence when it
comes to speculating on the merits of a negotiated business
agreement. For example, in Schering-Plough, most of the allegedly
illegal payments were in the form of licensing fees provided for in an
ancillary licensing agreement. 258 The FTC conducted an extensive
analysis of the business justifications for the agreement, delving deep
into the negotiations leading up to the licensing agreement, the market
for the products, the expected value of the in-licensed products, and
the ultimate failure of Schering to commercialize the products.259
Ultimately, the FTC concluded that Schering paid more for the in-
licensed technology than they would have in an arm's-length business
negotiation, supporting an inference that licensing fees were in reality
merely camouflaged payments in exchange for delayed generic
entry. 260 However, as discussed below, on appeal the Eleventh
255. Id.
256. Id. at 9.
257. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 33-35 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11 th Cir. 2005).
258. The settlement agreement that the FTC found most problematic, between Schering
and Upsher, did not include any direct payment to the patent challenger. However, as part of the
settlement, Schering agreed to license the right to market five Upsher products in exchange for
$60 million in initial royalty fees, $10 million in milestone royalty payments, and 10% or 15%
royalty on sales. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059-60 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
259. Id. at 1069-70.
260. Id. at 1070.
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Circuit rejected the FTC's conclusion that the licensing payments
were actually payments for delayed market entry and criticized the
methodology used to arrive at that conclusion.261
Courts favor and encourage settlement, particularly in patent
cases. 262 Most district courts find it difficult to deal with the
intricacies of law and technology that so often pervade patent
litigations, and patent cases also generally consume more judicial
resources than other types of litigation. 263 For this reason, courts
sometimes compel patent litigants to participate in court-supervised
mediation, wherein the court actively proposes settlement terms,
pressures the parties to reach agreement, and affirmatively approves
the resulting settlement. 264 One might think that the pervasive,
perhaps even coercive, role played by a federal court, and the court's
affirmative sanctioning of the resulting agreement, would justify
some inference that the agreement is not illegal under the antitrust
laws. However, based on the Commission's decision in Schering-
Plough, it appears that the FTC does not hold this view.
In that case, Schering-Plough engaged in 15 months of court-
supervised mediation with ESI, a generic company that had filed a
Paragraph IV challenge to a Schering patent. The mediation resulted
in nothing more than an impasse. 265 At this point the parties agreed, in
principle, to a settlement splitting the remaining patent, pursuant to
which ESI would enter almost three years prior to patent expiration.
266
However, ESI demanded that the settlement include some form of
26payment. 67 The federal judge overseeing the mediation actively
intervened, working with Schering to develop a proposal whereby
Schering would make payments to ESI, 268 which the FTC later
characterized as reverse payments in exchange for delayed market
entry. ESI accepted the proposal including payment, and the
settlement was signed in the judge's presence.269
261. See infra Section V.F.
262. See infra Section V.B.
263. Robert M. Isackson & Bridgette Y. Ahn, Legislation Proposes Pilot Program Toward
Development of Specialized District Court Judges, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 2006, available in
reprinted form at http://www.orrick.com/newsevents/news/orrick-nyljdec2006.pdf.
264. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1060.
265. Id
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1060-61.
269. Id. at 1061.
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In its hearing before the Commission, Schering defended the
legality of the payments by pointing to the active involvement and
approval of a federal judge. 270 The Commission did not refute
Schering's allegation, explicitly acknowledging that Schering was
subject to "intense, and perhaps unseemly, judicial pressure" from a
"settlement-minded judge," and that in view of this pressure the
company may well have been concerned about its future litigation
prospects; for example, the court's pressure to settle could have
adversely affected Schering's perceived bargaining position. 271
However, the Commission faulted Schering essentially for not
standing up to the judicial pressure, stating that Schering should have
attempted to find creative solutions that would have allowed it to
reach a settlement without resorting to payments.272
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit seemed troubled by the FTC's
failure to place any weight on the courts pervasive, perhaps even
coercive, role in crafting and sanctioning the settlement terms.273 The
court noted that "[v]eritably, the Commission's opinion would leave
settlements, including those endorsed and facilitated by a federal
court, with little confidence.
2 74
FTC commissioners and other representatives have also become
increasingly outspoken in their concerns regarding reverse payments
in a variety of forums outside the context of litigation. In an April 24,
2006 presentation at the Second Annual In-House Counsel's Forum
on Pharmaceutical Antitrust, FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz
characterized two appellate court decisions rejecting antitrust
challenges to reverse payments settlements as "misguided" and as
posing a substantial threat to the "delicate balance of Hatch-
Waxman. ' ' 275 According to Commissioner Leibowitz, unless these
decisions are reversed, drug companies "will have carte blanche to
avoid competition and share resulting profits, and we will see
minimal competition before patent expiration.,
276
270. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 82 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11 th Cir. 2005).
271. Id.
272. See id
273. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1071-72 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
274. Id. at 1072.
275. Leibowitz Speech, supra note 77, at 1.
276. Id. at 8.
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On July 20, 2006, in a prepared statement before the Senate's
Special Committee on Aging, the FTC reiterated its position that
reverse payment agreements are anticompetitive and ought to be
presumptively illegal, and warned that the Second and Eleventh
Circuits' rejection of this position in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litigation and Schering-Plough had "staggering" negative economic
implications and would result in "tremendous" cost to consumers,
277insurers, employers and the government.
The FTC's position on reverse payment on settlements has been
characterized as presumptive illegality, 278 and from a practical
standpoint, that is probably an apt characterization. 279 A number of
academic commentators have taken even stronger positions against
settlements including reverse payments. 280 For example, Hovenkamp
et al. have suggested the following rule:
In an antitrust challenge, a payment from a patentee to an
infringement defendant for the latter's exit from the market is
presumptively unlawful, shifting the burden of proof to the
infringement plaintiff. The infringement plaintiff can defend by
showing both (1) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its
infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the
payment is no more than the expected value of litigation and
collateral costs attending the lawsuit.
281
Taken literally, this standard would apparently render any patent
settlement involving a reverse payment exceeding litigation costs per
se illegal. Some members of Congress would go even further; a bill
was recently introduced in the Senate that would essentially find
reverse payments settlements per se illegal, with no exception even
for payments less than or equal to expected savings on litigation
costs.
28 2
In contrast, the FTC would apparently recognize pro-competitive
justifications for even sizeable reverse payments in certain
circumstances. In Schering-Plough, the Commission accepted, in
277. FTC Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2, at 17, 19.
278. See, e.g., Brief for Bayer Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-4, FTC
v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (No. 05-273), available at
http://www.orangebookbiog.com/Brief 2005 2D1 18 2D06 20184752.pdf
[hereinafter Bayer Brief Opposing Grant of Certiorari in Schering-Plough].
279. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
280. See, e.g., Hovenkamp et al., supra note 10.
281. Id. at 1759.
282. See infra Section VI.B.
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principle, the argument that, in some circumstances, a reverse
payment to a "cash-starved" generic company might enable the
generic company to enter the market earlier and more effectively, and
such a payment could be pro-competitive. 283 The Commission also
recognized that in cases where the generic company is relatively small
and considers itself "judgment-proof," it might "hold out for
'unreasonable' settlement terms because its downside risk[] of
damage exposure [is] small., 284 It further accepted the argument that
in some cases, where the generic challenger perceives a higher
likelihood of success in the patent litigation than the patent owner, the
only way to bridge the difference in expectations might be by means
of cash payments.28 5
C. Schering-Plough Exemplifies This Shift in FTC Focus
The FTC's shift in emphasis from agreements with the potential
to park GE, and other restrictions extending beyond the exclusionary
potential of the patent, to a focus on reverse payments as
anticompetitive in and of themselves can be traced in its enforcement
action against Schering, which ultimately became the basis for its
petition for certiorari in Schering-Plough. The enforcement action
targeted two agreements between Schering and Paragraph IV filers
Upsher and ESI.2 86 When the enforcement action was initially filed, it
included an allegation that an agreement between Schering and
Upsher, the first-filer, required Upsher to park its GE and thereby
kept "all other potential generic competitors out of the market.,
287
With respect to the other agreement, the complaint alleged that ESI
had agreed to refrain from marketing the allegedly infringing product
or "any other generic version of [the product], regardless of whether
such product would infringe Schering's patents.,288 Thus, as was the
case with the earlier enforcement actions filed against Abbott and
Hoechst Marion Roussel, the FTC focused on barriers to third party
289generic entry or restrictions on products not covered by the patent.
283. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 37 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11 th Cir. 2005).
284. Id. at 38.
285. Id.
286. Complaint, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9293 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/scheringpart3cmp.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
287. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
289. See supra Section W.A.
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To the extent these restrictions could be characterized as exceeding
the exclusionary potential of the patent, as has been held by a number
of courts, they would be illegal under the application of standard
antitrust law.
However, an administrate law judge ("AL") sided with
Schering and rejected the FTC's theory of antitrust liability, explicitly
finding that the FTC had failed to establish that the agreement with
Upsher imposed any barrier on third party generic entry, or that the
GE period was manipulated or even discussed by Schering and
Upsher. 290 The AL's opinion does not address the allegation that the
ESI agreement extended to non-infringing products. However, the
FTC complaint counsel made the same allegation with respect to the
Upsher agreement. 291 It was alleged, for example, that the class of
products Upsher covenanted not to market was broader than the scope
of the patent claims. 292 The ALJ rejected this argument, finding that
the scope of products covered by the agreement did not extend
beyond a reasonable interpretation of the patent claims, and no more
than "reasonably necessary" to accomplish the goals of the
agreement.293 In short, the FTC's original case against the agreements
based on terms extending beyond the scope of the patent or parking
GE apparently did not survive serious scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the FTC did not drop the action, but instead shifted
its focus to the presence of reverse payments. 294 On appeal, the
Commission did not dispute the ALJ's determination that the Upsher
agreement did not park GE,295 nor did they address the issue of
290. In re of Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 113-14 (F.T.C. July 2, 2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/scheringinitialdecisionp2.pdf, rev'd, No. 9297 (F.T.C. Dec. 18,
2003), vacated, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 114-15.
294. Professor Calkins has observed that the FTC, unlike the DOJ, is generally more
interested in winning its cases than in educating courts about economics. Stephen Calkins,
Developments in Merger Litigation: The Government Doesn't Always Win, 56 ANTITRUST L.J.
855, 883 (1987).
295. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, slip op. at 87 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11 th Cir. 2005). The Eleventh Circuit stated that:
The order is modeled on Complaint Counsel's proposed remedy, with one
significant exception. We delete in their entirety proposed provisions relating to a
first-filing generic's 180-day exclusivity. We have not analyzed the effects of any
such agreements in this opinion and believe it is inappropriate to address them in
the order.
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whether the agreements extended beyond the exclusionary potential
of the patent. Instead, the Commission's analysis focused on the
existence and substantial size of reverse payments, and an assumption
that, in the absence of payments, any settlement agreement would
have- included an earlier generic entry date.2 96 Based solely on a
factual determination that the payments were in exchange for delayed
generic entry, the Commission found the agreement to be illegal.297
V. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE COURTS
Much to the chagrin of the FTC and others, courts have
repeatedly refused to find a basis for antitrust liability in reverse
payments. 298 Some percentage of antitrust challenges to reverse
payments settlements have succeeded, but in those cases the
determination of illegality was based on other factors, not on the basis
of a reverse payment per se. 2 99 Generally, courts will only find an
antitrust violation if terms of the agreement restricts competition to an
extent exceeding the exclusionary potential of the patent.300 This most
typically occurs when the agreement is found to result in a parking of
GE, creating a bottleneck blocking all third party generic market
entry, or when the agreement requires the generic company to refrain
from marketing or developing products that would not infringe the
patent. 301 This standard is consistent with a line of earlier court
decisions that have generally found that agreements involving patents
do not violate the antitrust laws, so long as the terms of the agreement
do not extend beyond the exclusionary potential of the patent.30 2 It is
296. Id. at 25-26.
297. Id. at 87.
298. Most of the cases discussed in this section were not brought by the FTC, but by a vast
array of plaintiffs including other potential generic competitors, state attorney generals,
consumers, third party purchasers, and other parties that have an interest in lower drug prices.
299. See infra Section V.A.
300. See infra Section V.A.
301. See infra Section V.A.
302. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("The appropriate criterion is whether Mallinckrodt's restriction.., has ventured beyond the
patent grant.... Should the restriction be found to be reasonably within the patent grant, i.e.,
that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims, that ends the [antitrust]
inquiry."); USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (antitrust liability
may lie "only upon proof of an anticompetitive effect beyond that implicit in grant of the
patent"); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("[T]he conduct at issue is illegal if it threatens competition in areas other than those
protected by the patent, and is otherwise legal .... None of these restraints go beyond what the
patent itself authorizes."); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981)
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also consistent with the FTC's early enforcement actions, which only
targeted agreements with restrictions alleged to exceed the
exclusionary potential of the patent.
30 3
A. The Consensus Test of the Eleventh and Second Circuits
The emerging consensus test for analyzing the legality of reverse
payment settlements under the antitrust laws, which focuses on the
extent to which the terms of the agreement exceed the exclusionary
potential of the patent, is exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit's
holdings in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3°4 and
Schering-Plough.°5 In Valley Drug, the court rejected a lower court's
ruling on partial summary judgment that two reverse payment
agreements were per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.30 6
The appellate court acknowledged that the decision below would have
been correct were it not for the patent, reiterating the general rule that
an agreement to pay a potential competitor to stay off the market is a
307per se antitrust violation. However, in view of the existence of a
presumptively valid patent, the district court's per se treatment to the
agreement was in error.30 8 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit held that any
antitrust analysis of such an agreement must include a "consideration
of the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, the extent to
which the provisions of the Agreements exceed that scope, and the
anticompetitive effects thereof., 3
09
In Schering-Plough, the Eleventh Circuit essentially reiterated
the Valley Drug standard, holding that "the proper analysis of
antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive
effects. 3 °10 The court cited as an example of an agreement exceeding
the exclusionary potential of the patent an agreement intended merely
("[W]here a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent
laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws.").
303. See supra Section IV.A.
304. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
305. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2929 (2006).
306. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304 (characterizing them as geographic market allocation
agreements between horizontal competitors).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1305.
309. Id at 1312.
310. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312).
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to circumvent antitrust laws, or where the settlement resolves a patent
litigation involving a patent which the patent owner knows is almost
certainly invalid. 31 The court noted that when a patent is involved the
mere -existence of anticompetitive effects cannot be the basis for
antitrust liability, since patents are by their very nature
anticompetitive. 3 2 Antitrust liability only attaches when
anticompetitive effects exceed the exclusionary potential of the
patent.31 3 In view of the fact that the FTC had never even alleged that
the Schering patent was invalid or would not have been infringed by
the proposed generic product, it could not establish anticompetitive
effects exceeding those inherent in the patent grant.
314
Recently, the Second Circuit essentially adopted the Eleventh
Circuit's standard, holding that "absent an extension of the monopoly
beyond the patent's scope, ... and absent fraud, ... the question is
whether the underlying infringement lawsuit was 'objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits."' 315 Consistent with the Eleventh
Circuit, the Second Circuit held that "the central criterion as to the
legality of a patent settlement agreement is whether it exceeds the
scope of the patent's protection.', 31 6 The Second Circuit concluded
that a patent settlement, regardless of whether it includes a reverse
payment, is generally not in violation of the antitrust laws so long as
the patent holder is not acting in bad faith "beyond the limits of the
patent monopoly" to restrain or monopolize trade. 317 The court
stressed that reverse payments settlements could be unlawful under
certain circumstances, such as if the settlement is merely a device for
circumventing the antitrust laws, for example, a "sham" or otherwise
baseless litigation involving a patent that would almost certainly not
survive a judicial challenge. 31 8 But the court stated that if "there is
nothing suspicious about the circumstances of a patent settlement,
311. Id. at 1067 (citing Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d
986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
312. Id. at 1065-66.
313. Id. at 1066.
314. Seeid. at 1066 n.15.
315. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993)),
petition for cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
316. Id. at 213 n.27 (internal quotes omitted).
317. Id. at 197, 213 (quoting United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948))
(internal quotes omitted).
318. Id. at 208 (citing Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986,
991 (N.D. 111. 2003)).
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then to prevent a cloud from being cast over the settlement process a
third party should not be permitted to haul the parties to the settlement
over the hot coals of antitrust litigation."319
In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,320 the first appellate
decision to assess the antitrust liability of a reverse payment
settlement, the Sixth Circuit held a reverse payment settlement
agreement to be per se illegal. 321 Nevertheless, the decision was
entirely consistent with the Eleventh and Second Circuits' consensus
"exceeding the reasonable exclusionary potential of the patent"
standard. The case involved Cardizem CD, a timed-release version of
a drug widely prescribed for use in the treatment of angina and
hypertension and for the prevention of heart attack and strokes.322 The
core patent covering the drug's active ingredient diltiazem
323hydrochloride expired in 1992. However, the drug's manufacturer
Hoechst Marion Roussel ("HMR") in-licensed rights to a patent that
they represented covered the timed-release formulation embodied in
Cardizem CD. 324 They listed the patent in the Orange Book, 325
resulting in a de facto extension of patent exclusivity. While generic
companies were free to market some generic version of the drug's
active ingredient, 326 they could not obtain FDA approval to compete
in the presumably much more lucrative market for the time-released
formulation without challenging the formulation patent.327 However,
not surprisingly, in view of the commercial success of Cardizem CD,
a generic company did file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV
certification challenging the formulation patent, and HMR timely
319. Id. (quoting Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992) (internal quotes omitted).
320. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 896 (6th Cir. 2003). This appears
to be the first appellate decision to specifically assess the legality of a reverse payment
settlement.
321. Id.
322. Id. at901.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 902.
325. Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, Electronic Orange Book Home Page,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/ (follow "Search by Patent" hyperlink; then follow "Search by
Patent Number" hyperlink; then enter "5470584" in text box and click "Submit" button).
326. Generally, in similar circumstances, the branded company focuses its marketing
efforts on switching customers to the patented time-release formulation, based on the supposed
superior efficacy of the follow-up product (in this case, the benefits of a time-released
formulation).
327. Technically, a generic company could seek approval through the full-blown NDA
process, but because of the substantially higher costs compared to an ANDA, this route to
approval was probably not practically feasible.
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responded by filing a lawsuit within forty-five days to trigger the
automatic thirty-month stay.328
Andrx, the generic challenger, obtained tentative approval of its
ANDA on September 15, 1997,329 and represented to the court
hearing the patent case that it intended to enter the market
immediately upon expiration of the thirty-month stay in July 1998,
regardless of whether the litigation had been decided at that point.
330
However, on September 24, 1997, well prior to the possibility of
market entry by the generic, the parties reached an interim settlement
whereby Andrx essentially agreed to refrain from marketing a generic
version of the branded drug until the patent litigation had been finally
decided, up through and including any appeal to the Supreme Court,
in exchange for quarterly payments of $10 million beginning the date
Andrx received final FDA approval.331 Significantly, the agreement
required Andrx to park its 180-day GE, thereby creating a bottleneck
preventing the approval of any other generic version of the drug.
332
Furthermore, the agreement was not limited to timed-release
formulations covered by the patent at issue, but extended to any
generic version of Cardizem CD, including generic versions that
would not infringe the patent.333
The Sixth Circuit held that the agreement was an illegal restraint
of trade and a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.334 The
decision is somewhat opaque as to the specific basis for the per se
designation; however, it is worth stressing that the Sixth Circuit never
indicated that the existence of reverse payments in and of themselves
rendered the agreement illegal. The court's criticism of the agreement
focuses primarily on the parking of Andrx's 180-day GE and the
effect of the agreement to exclude third party generic entry.335 The
328. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
329. Id. Tentative approval of the ANDA indicates that FDA is satisfied with the
bioequivalency and other technical requirements for ANDA approval, and that final approval is
contingent merely upon expiration or termination of the thirty-month stay. Id.
330. Id. Entering the market prior to resolution of the patent dispute is referred to as entry
"at risk," owing to the generic company's exposure to huge potential damages if the generic
product is ultimately found to infringe a valid patent.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See id. In view of the fact that the core patent covering the drug's active ingredient
had long expired, in principle, such a design was quite possible. In fact, Andrx certified to HMR
that it had successfully developed a timed-release formulation of the drug that it did not infringe
the formulation patent. Id. at 903.
334. Id. at 907-08.
335. Id.
[Vol. 23
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
court states that "[b]y delaying Andrx's entry into the market, the
Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who
could not enter until the expiration of Andrx's 180-day period of
marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or
transfer., 336 The court went on to find that the agreement illegally
"bolster[ed] the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by
paying the only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out
of the market.,
337
In essence, the Sixth Circuit found that the agreement restricted
competition in a manner that exceeded the reasonable exclusionary
potential of the patent. Normally the. exclusionary potential of the
patent is limited by the requirement that a patentee convince a court to
enjoin allegedly infringing activity. Even in the context of a
Paragraph IV filing, where the exclusionary potential is enhanced by
the thirty-month stay provisions available for patents listed in the
Orange Book, a generic challenger is able to gain marketing approval
after the thirty-month stay has run its course.338 However, a parked
GE has the potential to block all generic competition indefinitely,
without the showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits that would be required for a preliminary injunction.339
The agreement also exceeded the exclusionary potential of the
patent by barring Andrx from marketing any generic version of
Cardizem CD, which would include potential variations falling
outside the nominal scope of the patent claims. 340 The patent at issue
literally claimed only timed release formulations whose dissolution
profile resulted in the release of from 0-45% of the total active
ingredient within 18 hours. 341 Andrx's ANDA specified that the
dissolution profile for its generic product was not less than 55% of the
total active ingredient released within 18 hours; 34 2 if true, Andrx's
product clearly avoided the literal scope of the patent. Nevertheless,
according to the terms of the agreement Andrx was barred from
marketing even a clearly non-infringing generic variant. 343 The
district court decision emphasized the significance of this extension of
336. Id. at 907.
337. Id. at 908.
338. See supra Section III.B.3.
339. See supra Section II.B.3.
340. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
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the patent's exclusionary power in its determination that the
agreement was per se illegal.344
Lower courts have also generally been unreceptive to allegations
of antitrust liability based solely on the presence of reverse
payments.345 In fact, the only notable district court decision finding a
patent settlement illegal based on the existence of a reverse payment
was Terazosin 1, 346 the decision subsequently reversed by the
Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug.34 7 On remand in Terazosin II, the
district court again found the agreement to be per se illegal, but this
time not based on the presence of reverse payments.348 Instead, paying
heed to the admonition from the Eleventh Circuit, the court focused
on the extent to which the agreement exceeded the exclusionary
potential of the patent. 349 The court assessed the merits of the patent
case, and found that, in view of the questionable validity of the patent,
the district court would have been unlikely to grant a preliminary
injunction.350 The district court posited that, prior to a final judgment
on the merits, the exclusionary potential of a patent is restricted to the
ability to obtain a preliminary injunction, and an agreement having
the effect of a preliminary injunction exceeds the exclusionary
potential of the patent, if such an injunction is unlikely to be
granted.35'
Perhaps more importantly, the district court characterized as
"undisputed and dispositive" the fact that the agreement parked the
generic's GE and prevented any other generic company from entering
the market.352 The court was also influenced by the fact that the
agreement "barred Geneva from marketing any terazosin
344. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 699 (E.D. Mich. 2000),
aff'd, 332 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit's decision seems to rely less heavily on
this aspect of the agreement, although it does make note of it. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 909 n.13.
345. See, e.g., Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994
(N.D. I11. 2003); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 250-
52 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), summary judgment granted by, complaint dismissed at 363 F. Supp. 2d 514
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
346. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin 1), 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340
(S.D. Fla. 2000), rev'd, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (1 1th Cir.
2003).
347. Id.
348. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin I1), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279
(S.D. Fla. 2005).
349. Id. at 1286.
350. Id. at 1306.
351. Id. at 1294-96. It is far from clear that the district court's analysis was true to the
spirit of the direction provided by the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug.
352. Id. at 1314-15.
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hydrochloride product, including those that were not at issue in the
patent case," even though the core patent covering the drug had
expired.353 Since the court found that the agreement exceeded the
exclusionary potential of the patent, by creating a bottleneck to third
party generic entry and by extending to clearly non-infringing
products, and because the patentee probably would have not been able
to obtain a preliminary injunction, the court had no need to rely solely
on the presence of reverse payments to presume antitrust liability.
In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Litigation,354 a district
court residing in the Second Circuit rejected any presumption of
illegality based on reverse payment, thus anticipating that circuit's
subsequent adoption of the consensus test in Tamoxifen. 355 The
Ciprofloxacin court held that although it went "without saying that
patents have adverse effects on competition," the ultimate question
was "whether any adverse effects on competition stemming from the
[a]greements were outside the exclusionary zone of the...
[p]atent. ' '356 Because the agreements did not exceed this exclusionary
potential, the court found that plaintiffs had not established
illegality.357
In contrast, courts are generally receptive to the argument that a
reverse payment agreement is illegal because its terms exceed the
exclusionary potential of the patent, particularly in cases where the
agreement has the effect of parking GE.358 As discussed above, this
was the case in Cardizem.359 Likewise, in Andrx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, the first appellate decision to
comment upon the legality of reverse payment settlements in general,
the D.C. Circuit held that an agreement to park GE, and thereby
exclude third party generic entry, is a restraint of trade cognizable
under antitrust laws.3 60 Recently, in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Elan Corp., PLC, the Eleventh Circuit held that the allegation that an
agreement parked GE and blocked third party generic entry stated
353. Id. at 1317.
354. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
355. Id.
356. Id. at 523.
357. Id. at 540-41. Likewise, in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D.III. 2003), Judge Posner (sitting by designation) provides his own
reasoned explanation as to why it would be inappropriate to presume illegality based solely on
the presence of reverse payments. Id.
358. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
359. See supra notes 335-337 and accompanying text.
360. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
2007]
548 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 1.J. [Vol. 23
antitrust restraint of trade claims under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 361 Further, in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Judge Posner also endorsed the view that
reverse payment settlements would violate the antitrust laws if the
terms clearly exceeded the reasonable exclusionary potential of the
patent.362
The Second Circuit also specifically noted the relevance of GE
parking in the antitrust inquiry.363 In distinguishing the agreements at
issue in Tamoxifen from those that were found illegal in Cardizem
and Terazosin II, the court noted that the agreements found to be
illegal in those cases effectively blocked any third party generic
competition. In contrast, the court noted that the Tamoxifen
agreement actually had the opposite effect, by "clear[ing] the way for
other generic manufacturers to seek to enter the market., 365 It was
also apparent that the Tamoxifen agreement did not extend to non-
infringing products; because the patent at issue covered the drug's
active ingredient and thus, by definition, any generic version of the
drug, an agreement not to sell any generic version of the drug would
not exceed the scope of the claims.366 In contrast, recall that the
agreements in Cardizem and Terazosin II extended to all generic
products, while the patents were limited to specific formulations and
therefore might not have encompassed a design-around generic.367
361. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (1lth Cir. 2005).
This would seem to refute claims made by some that after Schering-Plough reverse payment
settlement agreements are per se legal in the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., FTC Petition for
Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 12. Clearly that is not the case, at least where
GE is parked.
362. Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991-93.
363. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
364. Id. at215.
365. Id. This "clearing" effect was a consequence of the way in which FDA interpreted
Hatch-Waxman's 180-day exclusivity provisions at the time of the agreement. Under that
interpretation, FDA would only grant 180-day exclusivity to the first Paragraph IV filer to
"successfully defend" its patent challenge. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). By entering a final settlement (as opposed to the interim settlement in Cardizem and
the Terazosin cases) that terminated litigation, Barr Labs, the first Paragraph IV filer, forfeited
its right to 180-day exclusivity, thereby removing one impediment to third party generic entry.
FDA's successful defense requirement was later eliminated by a court decision finding it
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, Mova, 140 F.3d at 1076, but that does not change
the fact that at the time of the agreement the parties would have thought the agreement cleared
the field for other competitors.
366. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 214.
367. Id.
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B. Courts Generally Favor Settlement
Courts cite to a variety of rationales supporting the consensus
rejection of presumptive illegality based on reverse payment. For
example, courts typically point to a general policy in favor of the
settlement of litigation, particularly with respect to complex and
judicial resource intensive patent disputes. 368 In Valley Drug, the
Eleventh Circuit cited to this policy favoring settlement and
concluded that to find an "ostensibly reasonable settlement of patent
litigation gives rise to per se antitrust liability ... would obviously
chill such settlements, thereby increasing the cost of patent
enforcement and decreasing the value of patent protection
generally., 369 In Schering-Plough, the same court noted that there "is
no question that settlements provide a number of private and social
benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects of
litigation.,
370
In Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit concurred with the Eleventh
Circuit's assessment, noting further that rules restricting the ability of
parties to settle might actually delay generic entry and be contrary to
the goals of the patent system.37 1 In that decision, the court stressed
the public's interest in encouraging settlement, particularly in the
context of patent litigation, citing to a "longstanding adherence to the
principle that 'courts are bound to encourage' the settlement of
litigation. 372 The Second Circuit cited to a strong public interest in
settlement, particularly where a case is complex and expensive, and
the court's duty to protect the interest of the public and parties by
encouraging fair and efficient resolution. 373 The court further noted
that "[i]t is well settled that '[w]here there are legitimately conflicting
[patent] claims . . . , a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation,
is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act,' although such a settlement
may ultimately have an adverse effect on competition." 374 The
weakening of the patent right that would result from limitations on a
patentee's ability to settle a legitimate patent infringement suit, and
368. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
369. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2003).
370. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075.
371. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308).
372. Id. at 202 (quoting Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.
2004)).
373. Id. (citing United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856-57 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
374. Id. (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931)).
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the resulting attenuation of the incentive effect of patents on
innovation, was also cited as justification for a deferential posture
with respect to an apparently reasonable patent settlement.375
As noted above, the FTC and some courts have tended to treat
interim settlements with more skepticism than agreements that finally
settle the underlying patent litigation.376 However, other courts have
posited that even interim settlements that block GE and involve
reverse payments might nonetheless be legitimate and even
procompetitive.377 For example, in Valley Drug, the lower court
concluded that an interim settlement agreement was detrimental to the
public interest because it tied the payments to the duration of the
litigation, thereby incentivizing the parties to delay the litigation.
378
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this conclusion. 37' While
acknowledging the existence and perversity of the cited incentive, the
court found it to be unavoidable if the parties wished to further the
perfectly reasonable objective of compensating the generic company
for potential lost profits resulting from delayed market entry during
the course of litigation, much like a bond posted as part of a
preliminary injunction.380
C. Reallocation of Litigation Risk and Upside Potential
A number of courts have also expressly endorsed the theory
described above that the Hatch-Waxman scheme has substantially
reallocated that relative risks and potential rewards of patent
litigation, effectively reversing the incentives for payments in
exchange for settlement. 381 Based on this redistribution of risks,
rewards and incentives to settle, courts have held that even a patent
owner substantially confident in the merits of its patent will still find
it rational to make sizeable reverse payments.382 Essentially, the
presence of reverse payments is seen as a natural by-product of the
statute, not indicative of a weak patent case or bad intent on the part
375. Id. at 203 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308); Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Preliminary Views: Patent Settlement Agreements, ANTITRUST, Summer 2002, at 53;
Crane, supra note 79, at 749).
376. See supra Sections II, IV.A, V.A.
377. See, e.g., Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 1294.
378. Id. at 1310.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
382. See id at 1075 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1310).
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of the settling parties, and thus not a legitimate basis for imposing
antitrust liability.
The Eleventh Circuit endorsed this view in Schering-Plough,
noting that "Hatch-Waxman essentially redistributes the relative risk
assessments and explains the flow of settlement funds and their
magnitude." 383 The court cited with approval a more detailed
exposition of the theory provided in Ciprofloxacin,384 wherein that
court noted that Hatch-Waxman "has the unintended consequence of
altering the litigation risks of patent lawsuits" and concluded that
"reverse payments are a natural by-product of the Hatch-Waxman
process.385
Cardizem represents a prime example of a case where the normal
risks and upside potential of patent litigation have been substantially
reapportioned between the parties. The generic company Andrx filed
its ANDA on September 22, 1995, prior to the issuance of the
formulation patent which eventually became the subject of the patent
dispute.386 Not only that, at the time the ANDA was filed, the patent
application was owned by another company, Carderm Capital, which
had yet to license it to the branded company HMR.387 At that time,
pending patent applications were generally not publicly accessible,
388
so it is unclear whether Andrx was even aware of the existence of the
patent application. Only after the patent issued in November of 1995
did Carderm license the patent to HMR, thereby compelling Andrx to
file a Paragraph IV certification on December 30, 1995.389
In. short, at the time Andrx made the decision to invest in the
filing of an ANDA, it was probably unaware that its approval would
require a successful challenge of a yet-to-be-issued patent. By the
time the parties reached partial settlement, Andrx had already secured
tentative approval of its ANDA. 390 Most of its non-litigation costs
were already sunk, resulting in little exposure to risk if they did not
succeed in the patent challenge, but a huge upside potential if they did
383. Id. at 1074 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d
188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), summary judgment granted by, complaint dismissed at 363 F. Supp.
2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
384. Id. (citing Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 251).
385. Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
386. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).
387. Id.
388. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 62 (3d ed. 2002).
389. Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 902.
390. Id.
2007]
552 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.[.
succeed, enhanced by the 180-days of generic exclusivity. Simple
economics would dictate that Andrx would have little incentive to
settle without some substantial consideration from HMR, regardless
of their objective assessment of the merits of their case.
D. Courts Find Little Meaningful Distinction Between Reverse
Payment Settlements and Other Patent Settlements
A number of courts express skepticism as to the existence of any
principled distinction between reverse payment settlements and
"ordinary" patent settlements. 391 These courts note that most, if not
all, settlement agreements include some form of compensation from
the patent owner to the alleged infringer.392 Even where a settlement
involves a defendant making a "forward" payment to the patentee,
presumably this is in exchange for the patentee agreeing to forgo
pursuing the money damages that would be assessed in the event the
patent was found to be valid and infringed. 3 The patentee's
forbearance is the consideration flowing to the accused infringer, and
it has a monetary value in the same way as a reverse payment, albeit
the nature of the payment renders it less apparent and more difficult to
value. While the reverse payment in a Paragraph IV settlement is
easier to detect and quantify than the consideration flowing to the
defendant in most patent settlements, courts have expressed a
reluctance to find antitrust liability based solely on this, particularly
when the reverse payment is seen as a natural by-product of the
Hatch-Waxman scheme.394
In Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit noted that "even the typical
settlement of the ordinary patent infringement suit appears to involve
what may be characterized as a reverse payment." 395 Similarly, in
Ciprofloxacin, the court concluded that "even in the traditional
context, implicit consideration flows from the patent holder to the
391. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 207-08 n.20 (2d Cir. 2006),
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830); Asahi Glass Co.,
Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), summary judgment
granted by, complaint dismissed at 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
392. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207 n.20; Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994; Ciprofloxacin,
261 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
393. See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 353-54 (2006) (noting
that with litigation higher monetary returns can be achieved).
394. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207 & n.20; Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994;
Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
395. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207 n.20.
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alleged infringer."3 96 Sitting by designation in Asahi Glass, Judge
Posner, renowned for his application of economic theory to legal
decision-making, observed that "any settlement agreement can be
characterized as involving 'compensation' to the defendant, who
would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement.
If any settlement agreement is thus to be classified as involving a
forbidden 'reverse payment,' we shall have no more patent
settlements. 397
Commentators also question the distinction between reverse
payment settlements and other patent settlements. For example,
Daniel Crane asserts that "[i]t makes no sense to single out exclusion
payments for disfavor when the same potential for collusion arises in
any settlement involving the defendant's exit." 398 Thus, these courts
and commentators essentially conclude that the distinction between
reverse payment settlements and other patent settlements is to a large
extent illusory, reflecting the ease with which compensation in the
form of cash payments is observable and quantifiable rather than any
meaningful difference. Finding little principled basis to single out
reverse payments settlements, they reject the notion of antitrust
liability based purely on reverse payments.
E. Courts Will Not Infer a Weak Patent Case from Reverse
Payments
Courts have also been reluctant to infer from the presence of
reverse payments that the patent owner must have viewed the patent
case as weak, even in cases involving very large payments.3 99 Courts
tend to defer to the statutory presumption of patent validity, in
contrast with the FTC, which downplays the significance of the
presumption and characterizes the patent grant as nothing more than
"probabilistic rights," or a right to "try" to exclude competition.4 °°
The Second Circuit has held that "so long as the patent litigation is
neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is seeking to
arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is presumably
entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of
396. Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
397. Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
398. Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 698, 700 (2004).
399. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005), as
amended by 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec.
16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
400. FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 16-17.
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the patented product." 401 The Eleventh Circuit also expressed
deference to the presumption of validity, stating that "[b]y virtue of its
[patent], Schering obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI
from the market until they proved either that the [patent] was invalid
or that their products.., did not infringe. 4 °2
In Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit cautioned against inferring
from the size of reverse payments that the parties lacked faith in the
validity of the patent. The court pointed specifically to the
uncertainty inherent in any attempt to accurately assess: (I) a branded
drug company's lost profits, (2) potential profits for the generic
companies, (3) the risk of the defendant's inability to satisfy a
judgment, (4) the true cost of litigation, or (5) how much of the
payment might have been in exchange for provisions of the
agreements other than an acknowledgement of patent validity.
404
Valley Drug cites to Ciprofloxacin as an example of a case
where substantial reverse payments were made, even though
subsequent objective indicators suggested that the patent owners
actually had a strong patent case.4 °5 A patent settlement agreement
described in Ciprofloxacin required the patentee to pay an alleged
infringer $49.1 million to acknowledge the validity of the patent, and
at least $398 million for the alleged infringer to remain off the
market. 406 The validity of the disputed patent was subsequently
upheld by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent
Office") on reexamination and in three court challenges, which the
Valley Drug court took as objective evidence of the patent's inherent
strength.40 7 The Ciprofloxacin court refused to infer from the presence
of reverse payments that the parties believed that the merits of the
401. Tamoxifen, 429 F.3d at 392.
402. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066-67 (lth Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006). The FTC and others have criticized this statement of the law as
incorrect to the extent it suggests a presumption of infringement. See, e.g., FTC Petition for
Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 12. Clearly, there generally is no presumption
of infringement. However, this was likely just a case of the court speaking too loosely. The
question of whether the patent was valid or infringed was never an issue in the antitrust
litigation. To the contrary, the FTC steadfastly refused to speculate on the merits of the patent
case, characterizing any such inquiry as "not supported by law or logic." Schering-Plough, 402
F.3d at 1068 n.18 (internal quotes omitted).
403. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309-10 (11 th Cir. 2003).
404. Id. at 1310.
405. Id. (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188,
196, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), summary judgment granted by, complaint dismissed at 363 F. Supp.
2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
406. Id. (citing Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 196, 234).
407. Id. (citing Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 196, 234).
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patent case were weak.40 8 To the contrary, the court provided an
expansive analysis showing that the decision of a patent owner to
make even very large reverse payments could be rational and
compatible with a relatively high expectation of success on the
409
merits.
The Second Circuit in Tamoxifen specifically considered and
rejected the argument that "excessive" reverse payments could lead to
a presumption of antitrust liability. 4 10 The plaintiffs argued that the
size of reverse payments "'greatly exceeded the value [of the generic
company's 'best case scenario' in winning the appeal] and entering
the market with its own competitive generic product,"' and that it was
the excessive nature of the payment, as opposed to the mere presence
of a reverse payment, that constituted an antitrust violation.4 '
The Tamoxifen court began by observing that under certain
circumstances a reverse payment settlement could be illegal,
particularly if the settlement is merely a device for circumventing the
antitrust laws.4 12 The court cited, as an example, a scenario where the
underlying patent litigation is a "sham," or otherwise objectively
baseless, involving a patent that would almost certainly not survive a
judicial challenge.413 However, in cases where there "is nothing
suspicious about the circumstances of a patent settlement, then to
prevent a cloud from being cast over the settlement process a third
party should not be permitted to haul the parties to the settlement over
the hot coals of antitrust litigation., 41 4 The court then posited that
even if one were to assume that the large reverse payments belied the
fact that the patent owner lacked confidence in prevailing in the
patent litigation, such a lack of confidence does not amount to an
antitrust violation.4 15 The court endorsed Judge Posner's assessment
in Asahi Glass that:
408. See Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 251-52.
409. Id.
410. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208-10 (2d Cir. 2006), petition
for cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
411. Id. at 208. Note that the plaintiffs theory is more permissive towards reverse
payments than approaches advocated by the FTC and others that would essentially find any
reverse payment settlement unlawful, at least in cases where the payment amount exceeds some
de minimis reflecting saved litigation costs. See supra Sections II, IV.B-C.
412. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208 (citing Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc.,
289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
413. Id. (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991).
414. Id. (quoting Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992).
415. Id. at 210.
2007]
556 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.[
[T]he private thoughts of a patentee, or of the alleged infringer
who settles with him, about whether the patent is valid or whether
it has been infringed is not the issue in an antitrust case. A firm
that has received a patent from the patent office (and not by
fraud... ), and thus enjoys the presumption of validity that
attaches to an issued patent, 35 U.S.C. § 282, is entitled to defend
the patent's validity in court, to sue alleged infringers, and to settle
with them, whatever its private doubts, unless a neutral observer
would reasonably think either that the patent was almost certain to
be declared invalid, or the defendants were almost certain to be
found not to have infringed it, if the suit went to judgment. It is not
"bad faith" to assert patent rights that one is not certain will be
upheld in a suit for infringement pressed to judgment and to settle
the suit to avoid risking the loss of the rights. No one can be
certain that he will prevail in a patent suit.
416
The Tamoxifen court concluded that even "excessive" payments
to settle a lawsuit are not necessarily unlawful. 4 17 Essentially, the
court found that the antitrust laws do not prevent a patent owner from
paying to protect even a weak patent claim. Under this approach, the
size of the payment becomes irrelevant, because, even if one were to
take it as evidence of a subjective lack of confidence in the merits of
the patent case, a mere lack of confidence does not lead to antitrust
liability for settling the case.
F. Courts Have Rejected the FTC' Theories ofAntitrust
Liability
Courts have not been receptive towards the FTC's theory of
antitrust liability based on the probabilistic nature of the patent right,
nor the related theory of a consumer expectation interest in the
possibility that the patent challenge might have succeeded were it not
for the settlement. In Schering-Plough, the Eleventh Circuit was
particularly critical of the FTC's contention that Paragraph IV
litigants are required to settle their disputes by means of a negotiated
early entry date, or some other terms that benefit consumers to an
extent comparable to continuing with the lawsuit. 418 The court found
no basis in law for requiring patent litigants to choose between a
settlement that benefits consumers or being compelled to continue
416. Id. (quoting Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992-93 (citation omitted)).
417. Id. at213.
418. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-76 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
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with the litigation to final judgment. 419 It also rejected the FTC's
arguments based on the probabilistic nature of patents.420
In Ciprofloxacin, the plaintiffs essentially advanced the FTC's
theory that patents are mere probabilistic property rights, and that
parties to a Paragraph IV patent settlement are required by the
antitrust laws to settle their dispute in a manner that benefits
consumers.421 The court rejected these arguments, referring heavily to
the rationale articulated in Schering-Plough.422
The Second Circuit took a similar view in Tamoxifen, holding
that it is well settled that "'[w]here there are legitimately conflicting
[patent] claims. .. , a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation,
is not precluded by the [Sherman] Act,' although such a settlement
may ultimately have an adverse effect on competition. 'A2
3
As discussed above, in Schering-Plough, the FTC concluded that
licensing fees provided for in an ancillary licensing agreement
relating to a product not covered by the patent were in fact disguised
reverse payments - a quid pro quo for the generic's agreement to
delay market entry.424 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
FTC's conclusion that the licensing payments under the ancillary
agreements were actually payments for delayed market entry.425 The
court essentially criticized the FTC approach as paying too little
deference to the outcome of what, on their face, appeared to be
legitimate arm's-length negotiations.426 With the benefit of hindsight,
it was clear that the deal had not paid off for Schering, but the court
noted that it is typical for pharmaceutical companies to invest large
sums of money on compounds that ultimately never make it to the
market.427 The fact that, in retrospect, Schering paid too much for the
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
422. Id. at 531-33. According to the U.S. Solicitor General, as of May, 2006,
Ciprofloxacin was the only decision where a court specifically considered (and rejected) the
FTC's expected value approach. U.S. Brief Recommending Denial of Certiorari in Schering-
Plough, supra note 20, at 16.
423. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931)), petition for cert. filed, 75
U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
424. See supra Section IV.C.
425. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1070 (criticizing the conclusion as "not supported by
law or logic") (internal quotes omitted).
426. See id. at 1070-71.
427. Id. at 1071.
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in-licensed products is not evidence that the terms of the agreement
did not appear reasonable to Schering at the time the agreement was
entered into. 428 The court also identified a number of objective
indications of a legitimate business negotiation, such as the fact that
the company personnel involved in negotiating the terms of the
ancillary agreement were different from those involved in negotiating
a resolution of the patent dispute, and Schering's "long-documented
and ongoing interest" in licensing one of the products.429
G. The FTC and Courts Agree That the Antitrust Analysis
Should Generally Not Involve an Assessment of the
Merits of the Underlying Patent Case
One issue on which the courts and the FTC are in substantial
agreement is that the analysis of the legality of a reverse payment
settlement under the antitrust laws should generally not entail any
evaluation of the merits of the underlying patent case, at least in cases
where the patent case does not appear to be a sham or objectively
baseless, or the patent does not appear to have been obtained by
fraud.430
The FTC made it clear on a number of occasions that, as a
general policy, it does not consider it appropriate for the antitrust
inquiry to delve into the merits of the underlying patent dispute. 431 For
example, in the Commission's decision in Schering-Plough, the FTC
"question[ed] the utility of a rule that would give decisive weight to
an after-the-fact inquiry into the merits of the patent issues in a settled
case. ' ,432 The FTC went on to note that:
An after-the-fact inquiry by the Commission into the merits of the
underlying litigation is not only unlikely to be particularly helpful,
but also likely to be unreliable. As a general matter, tribunals
decide patent issues in the context of a true adversary proceeding,
and their opinions are informed by the arguments of opposing
counsel. Once a case settles, however, the interests of the formerly
contending parties are aligned. A generic competitor that has
agreed to delay its entry no longer has an incentive to attack
428. Id.
429. Id. at 1069.
430. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524-30
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (collecting and analyzing cases to reach this conclusion).
431. See, e.g., In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinion.pdf, vacated, 402 F.3d 1056
(11 th Cir. 2005).
432. Id. at 33.
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vigorously the validity of the patent in issue or a claim of
infringement.
433
The FTC concluded that determining antitrust liability based on
the merits of the underlying patent case would not be "supported by
law or logic.
434
An alternative rationale supporting the FTC's position is that the
FTC probably lacks the technical proficiency to analyze the merits of
a patents case, outside of extreme cases where the patent litigation is
clearly objectively baseless or fraudulent. FDA has taken that position
with respect to its own technical competence, adamantly refusing to
assess either the validity or scope of patents listed in the Orange
Book.435 This has led to problems in cases where branded drug
companies appear to be listing patents of questionable validity, or that
appear likely not to claim the branded drug.436 Nevertheless, FDA has
stuck to its guns, pointing out that an analysis of patent validity or
scope is a highly specialized skill with which the agency has no
institutional competence.437
The FTC's rejection of any assessment of the merits of a patent
case, of course, has required it to find some other basis for
characterizing reverse payment settlements illegal, which has likely
led to their focus on reverse payments, "probabilistic" patent rights,
and theories of consumer expectation interest in the outcome of
Paragraph IV litigations. However, as discussed throughout this
paper, the courts have not been receptive to these alternate theories. In
Schering-Plough, the Eleventh Circuit chastised the FTC for finding
the agreement illegal without any allegation that the patent was
invalid or would not have been infringed by the generic product.438
433. Id. at 34.
434. Id. at 9.
435. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,345 (Oct.
3, 1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) ("FDA does not have.., the expertise to review
patent information").
436. See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,676,
36,683 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
437. See Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. Leavitt, 459 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2006). See also 21
C.F.R. 314.53(f) (2006); Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 36,683. The high rate at which the Federal Circuit reverses district court claim constructions
is one example of the difficulty of accurately construing the scope of patent terms. If federal
courts have so much difficulty, even after the benefit of a full Markman hearing, does it make
sense to think FDA will be able to accurately construe claim scope based on a mere filing in the
Orange Book?
438. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067-68 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
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The Eleventh Circuit's position is based on the logic that, if the
restrictions imposed by the settlement agreement do not exceed those
that could be obtained by assertion of the presumptively valid patent
rights, then there cannot be an antitrust violation.439 Some have
interpreted Schering-Plough as mandating a fairly probing inquiry
into the merits of the underlying patent dispute in any antitrust
analysis of a reverse payment settlement.440 However, as discussed in
more detail below, in my view it would be a mistake to assume that
the Eleventh Circuit is mandating any inquiry beyond that required to
rebut a charge that the patent suit was fraudulent or objectively
baseless, or that the agreement extends to subject matter clearly
exceeding the scope of the patent claims.44 1
As previously discussed, both Tamoxifen and Asahi Glass
express the view that even the patent owner's subjective belief would
not be relevant in assessing the legality of a settlement under the
antitrust laws. 442 As a corollary, Judge Posner in Asahi Glass
concluded that it would be improper to independently assess the
merits of the patent case, except in cases where the patent was almost
certainly invalid or obtained by fraud.443 Similarly, in Tamoxifen, the
Second Circuit held that a reverse payment settlement is only illegal if
the patent litigation was a sham or objectively baseless, suggesting
that an inquiry into the merits of the case is inappropriate, except in
these extreme circumstances. 444 Likewise, in Cardizem, the Sixth
Circuit found the agreement to be illegal without engaging in any
445analysis of the merits of the patent case.
Some have interpreted the test in the Eleventh Circuit as
requiring an inquiry into the merits of the underlying patent
dispute.446 In fact, some have argued that this asserted requirement
constitutes a substantial split between the Second and Eleventh
Circuits that would warrant a grant of certiorari by the Supreme
Court.44 7 For example, in its petition for certiorari, the Tamoxifen
439. Id. at 1068.
440. See infra Section VI.A.
441. See infra Section VI.A.
442. See supra Section V.E.
443. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992-93 (N.D. I11.
2003).
444. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 208 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing
Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991),petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16,
2006) (No. 06-830).
445. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003).
446. See infra note 448 and accompanying text.
447. See infra Section VI.A.
[Vol. 23
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
plaintiffs argue that the Eleventh Circuit's test "inquires into the
underlying validity of the patent at the time of the exclusion payment
before judging the validity of the reverse payment agreement. 4 48 In
contrast, they characterize the Second Circuit's Tamoxifen test as
conferring presumptive legality on reverse payment settlements in the
absence of a sham lawsuit.449
Clearly the Eleventh Circuit test, as articulated in both Valley
Drug and Schering-Plough, implicitly requires some level of inquiry
into the merits of underlying patent case. Any test involving an
assessment of the exclusionary potential of a patent necessarily
requires some determination of the scope of the patent and its likely
validity. As examples of agreements exceeding the exclusionary
potential of the patent, the court pointed to agreements extending to
products outside the scope of the patent, or where the patent dispute is
a sham. 450 A determination on the first question clearly implicates
some construction of the claims, and the second some level of inquiry
into both the scope and likely validity of the patent.
But the same can be said of the Second Circuit's test, which
essentially adopts the Eleventh Circuit approach of looking to the
exclusionary potential of the patent, thus also implying some level of
inquiry into the merits of the patent case. In fact, neither the Eleventh
nor Second Circuits appears to be advocating any probing inquiry into
the merits of the case, or determination on points of validity or claim
construction with respect to which reasonable minds would disagree.
Instead, the level of inquiry in both circuits would seem to be, at
most, a perfunctory assessment at to whether there is at least some
448. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 75
U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830) (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003)), available at
http://www.orangebookblog.corii/Tamoxifen_20Cert_2OPetition.pdf [hereinafter Petition for
Certiorari in Tamoxifen]. Perhaps significantly, this assertion is only made in an off-handed
manner in the introduction to the "Reasons for Granting Petition" section of the brief. No
explanation as where exactly in the Valley Drug opinion this alleged test appears, and no pincite
is provided as to the location in the opinion of this test. An amici curiae brief to the Supreme
Court urging the grant of certiorari in Tamoxifen, filed by Prof Lemley and other professors of
economics, law and business, makes the same assertion. Brief for Professors of Economics,
Business and Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Tamoxifen, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333
(U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830) (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 1294), available at
http://www.orangebookblog.com/Tamoxifen_20cert_20final_20brief.pdf
[hereinafter Lemley Brief Supporting Grant of Certiorari in Tamoxifen].
449. Petition for Certiorari in Tamoxifen, supra note 448, at 8, 12.
450. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (citing Asahi
Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
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objective non-fraudulent basis for the suit, and whether the excluded
products fall within the nominal outer boundaries of the claims.
Assuming these criteria are met, neither circuit shows any inclination
for a more probing inquiry into the merits of the case; to the contrary,
both courts stress the negative policy implications of any such
probing inquiry.
The Tamoxifen plaintiffs characterized Valley Drug as
establishing a general test requiring an inquiry into the merits of the
underlying patent case. 45 However, in Valley Drug, the Eleventh
Circuit makes it clear that its holding was intended to be narrow,
owing to the early stage of the litigation.452 The court stressed the
importance of the presumption of validity of issued patents, and
concluded that settling parties should not be exposed to "antitrust
liability for the exclusionary effects of a settlement reasonably within
the scope of the patent merely because the patent is subsequently
declared invalid," because to do so would "undermine the patent
incentives. 45 3 In the words of the court, "[p]atent litigation is too
complex and the results too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast
whether enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will
expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were destroyed
by the mere invalidity of the patent." 454 The court advocates a very
high threshold for finding antitrust liability based on the merits of the
patent case, citing to a long string of cases that found antitrust
immunity based on the existence of a patent.4 55 The court also notes
that the only Supreme Court decision to address the circumstances
under which this immunity could be pierced was Walker Process
Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical Corp., wherein the
Court held that the antitrust claimant must prove that the patentee
knew that the patent had been obtained from the Patent Office by
fraud.4 56
As to the appropriate level of inquiry into the scope of the patent
claims, Valley Drug refers to the exclusionary "potential" of the
patent, implying a liberal interpretation of the scope of exclusion.4 57
This test does not seem to advocate that the court conduct any
451. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
452. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2003).
453. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added).
454. Id. (emphasis added).
455. Id. at 1307 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172, 177 (1965); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 (1948)).
456. Id. (citing Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177).
457. Id. at l311.
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rigorous construction of the claims along the lines of a Markman
hearing, but rather an assessment of the nominal boundaries of the
claim, such as would be required under the Second Circuit test.458
Valley Drug does acknowledge that it might be sufficiently apparent
that antitrust liability would be justified for certain unreasonable
settlements, such as those involving patents obtained by fraud, or
cases where the patentee, knew the patent was invalid or not
infringed.459
Valley Drug reversed and remanded the lower court's finding of
per se illegality based on reverse payment.46° On remand, the district
court in Terazosin II proceeded to assess the merits of the patent
case. 461 After determining that the patentee would likely not have
been able to obtain a preliminary injunction, the district court
concluded that the agreement exceeded the exclusionary potential of
the patent and proceeded to find the agreement per se illegal.462 To the
extent that the district court appears to have conducted a fairly
rigorous inquiry into the merits of the underlying patent dispute, it
arguably deviated from the test articulated by the Eleventh Circuit. 463
In Schering-Plough, decided after Terazosin 11, the Eleventh Circuit
took pains in attempting to reconcile the district court's decision with
the test announced in Valley Drug and Schering-Plough. 464 In
particular, the appellate court pointed out that the decision on remand
emphasized that the illegal agreement delayed generic entry for a
longer period of time than "'any reasonable interpretation of the
patent's protections would have provided. ,,465 Thus, as characterized
by the Eleventh Circuit, Terazosin II is not inconsistent with a test
requiring a very limited inquiry into the merits of the patent case - an
agreement extending beyond "any reasonable interpretation" of the
458. A Markman hearing is a pre-trial hearing limited to the issue of claim interpretation.
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 388, at 896.
459. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1308-09.
460. Id. at 1313.
461. See supra Section V.A.
462. See supra Section V.A.
463. It is not at all clear that the district court decision is consistent with the test set forth
by Eleventh Circuit. The district court purported to find the agreement per se illegal after the
Eleventh Circuit specifically held that per se treatment was not available in the case of a patent
settlement. See supra Section V.A.
464. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2929 (2006).
465. Id. at 1065 n.14 (quoting In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin
1/), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005)).
20071
564 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [
patent would seem to satisfy the Second Circuit's test of "objectively
baseless" and/or "exceeding the exclusionary potential of the patent."
Terazosin II appears to be the only case where a court inquired
into the merits of the patent case in determining the legality of a
reverse settlement agreement. This same court had initially found the
agreement per se illegal based on the presence of reverse payments;
having already determined the agreement to be illegal, the court might
have succumbed to the temptation to apply a strained interpretation of
Valley Drug to arrive at the same conclusion on remand.
Consistent with Valley Drug, in Schering-Plough, the Eleventh
Circuit does not necessarily advocate a probing inquiry into the merits
of the patent case substantially exceeding the Second Circuit's test.
Recall that Schering-Plough involved a case where the FTC had
found the agreements to be illegal based solely on the size of reverse
payments, and its conclusion that the parties could have settled under
terms that would have been more beneficial to consumers; the FTC
explicitly refrained from any inquiry into the merits of the patent
case. 466 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FTC's approach, noting that
the agreement could not be found illegal without some assessment of
the underlying patent case.467 However, Schering-Plough says nothing
about the level of inquiry that this assessment would entail - the
example it cites to of an agreement exceeding the exclusionary
potential of the patent is one involving a patent that is "'almost
certainly invalid. ' ' '468 It does not suggest the necessity of any probing
inquiry into the merits of the case.
The FTC and others have also interpreted the Eleventh and
Second Circuit tests as substantially consistent with one another as to
the level of inquiry into the merits of the patent case. For example, in
characterizing Schering-Plough, the FTC has stated that "the only
circumstance in which [the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough]
indicated the parties would exceed the exclusionary potential of the
patent was that of 'sham' infringement claims., 469 The FTC also
acknowledged that other courts interpret Schering-Plough as
establishing a test requiring an inquiry only into the nominal reach of
the patent, and not an assessment of the likelihood that the patent
466. Id. at 1066 n.15.
467. Id. at 1066.
468. Id. at 1067 (quoting Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d
986, 991 (N.D. 111. 2003)).
469. FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 14.
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owner would prevail in the litigation. 470 For example, Ciprofloxacin
rejects an argument that Schering-Plough and Valley Drug mandate
an inquiry into the potential invalidity of the patent, and finds that
Schering-Plough should instead be "more fairly read as requiring an
evaluation of the scope of the patent's claims, and not a post hoc
analysis of the patent's validity, an approach which ... has not been
endorsed by any court other than the Valley Drug district court on
remand.',47I
The district court in Ciprofloxacin also refused to conduct an
independent assessment of the underlying validity of the patent,
finding that such an inquiry might chill patent settlements
altogether.472 The district court also noted that the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits, the FTC, and various district courts all held that such an
inquiry would be inappropriate in this context.473
Courts are also generally unreceptive to attempts to prove a
reverse payment settlement agreement was illegal based on the fact
that the patent is ultimately determined to be invalid. This was the
case in Valley Drug, where the plaintiffs argued that the subsequent
invalidation of the patent rendered the settlement agreement per se
illegal.474 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, finding that, in
order to protect the value of patents and thus their utility as incentives
for innovation, it is important to shield facially legitimate patent
settlements from exposure to potential antitrust liability, based merely
on a subsequent finding that the patent is invalid.475
Courts have also declined to find an agreement illegal based on
the fact that, at the time the agreement was entered into, the patent
was held invalid in a non-final decision. This was the case in
Tamoxifen, where, at the time the parties entered the reverse payment
settlement, the patent case was pending on an appeal to the Federal
Circuit of a lower court's determination that the patent was invalid
and unenforceable.476 On appeal, plaintiffs emphasized the fact that
470. FTC Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2, at 16.
471. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 539
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
472. Id. at 530.
473. Id. at 524-30.
474. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2003).
475. Id. at 1308.
476. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830). This was based on the court's
conclusion that the patentee "had deliberately withheld 'crucial information' from the [Patent
Office] regarding tests that it had conducted on laboratory animals with respect to the safety and
effectiveness of the drug." Id.
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the patent was ultimately found invalid by a court, but the Second
Circuit determined this fact had little probative effect. 477 The court
pointed to the inherent uncertainty with respect to predicting
outcomes of patent litigation, and the fact that no one could accurately
predict what the outcome of the appeal would have been, if the parties
had failed to settle.478 For example, the court pointed to the fact that,
subsequent to the district court's patent decision, three other generic
companies had filed Paragraph IV certifications challenging the
patent, and all three subsequent challenges had failed. 479 In other
words, other courts rejected the conclusion of the first district court,
suggesting at least the possibility that the Federal Circuit would have
done so as well, and highlighting the uncertainty of patent
480litigation.
It bears to note that the Tamoxifen plaintiffs apparently never
specifically alleged that the patent was invalid or not infringed, but
instead sought to rely solely on the first district court decision
invalidating the patent to establish antitrust liability.481 However, the
patent owner's successful defense of the patent's validity in three
subsequent litigations tends to refute any inference that the first patent
litigation was either a sham or objectively baseless. 482
The DOJ has endorsed the view that some limited inquiry into
the merits of the patent case is appropriate in determining the legality
of a reverse payment settlement. In its amicus brief recommending
against a grant of certiorari in Schering-Plough, the Solicitor General
posits that an "appropriate legal standard [in assessing the legality of
a reverse payment settlement] should take into account the relative
likelihood of success of the parties' claims., 483 However, he clarifies
that
[a] court would not need to conduct a full trial on the merits of the
patent claims in order to make a determination regarding the
likelihood of a patent owner's litigation success. Rather, a court
could conduct a limited examination into the relative merits of the
477. See id. at 204.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. See id. at 194-95, 204.
481. Id. at 202.
482. Id. at 211.
483. U.S. Brief Recommending Denial of Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 20, at
11.
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patent claims and other relevant factors surrounding the parties'
484negotiations .
H. Barriers to Third Party Generic Entry Are Relevant in
Assessing Potential Anticompetitive Effect
A consideration of barriers to third party generic entry is relevant
in any assessment of the potential anticompetitive effect of a
settlement agreement. As previously discussed, in the absence of
significant barriers to third party generic entry, a reverse payment
settlement with one generic company might have little effect on
competition overall, whereas, in the presence of substantial barriers to
third party generic entry, an agreement with a single generic company
might effectively foreclose any generic competition. 485 Agreements
with the potential to park GE are of the most concern, but there are
also other substantial barriers to third party generic entry, primarily
arising from the lengthy FDA pre-marketing approval process.
The FTC and some other critics of reverse payment settlements
implicitly assume very high barriers to third party generic entry,
which facilitates a reverse payment settlement between two parties
with the potential to effectively block all generic competition.486
However, aside from parking GE, they normally do not explicitly
point out and assess other specific barriers to third party generic entry.
Courts, on the other hand, often implicitly assume that barrier's to
third party generic entry are not overly high, with the exception of
cases of GE parking. For example, a number of courts noted that, in
general, a reverse payment settlement should not be effective in
foreclosing competition, particularly where the merits of the patent
case are weak, because of the ability of third parties to challenge the
patent.487 This, of course, ignores the issue of the regulatory barrier to
third party generic entry discussed above. Only in cases where there
are a sufficient number of other Paragraph IV filers waiting in the
wings will it be correct that an agreement with the first-filer does not
impede market entry by any generic competition.
Courts clearly recognize that GE parking has a high potential to
be anticompetitive, and have on a number of occasions classified GE
parking as a restriction exceeding the exclusionary potential of the
484. Id. at l l n.1.
485. See supra Section III.B.
486. See supra Section IV.
487. See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
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patent, thereby bringing settlement agreements containing such
provisions outside the antitrust immunity generally conferred upon
patent settlements.488
In Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit noted that a challenged reverse
payment settlement was not in violation of the antitrust laws, because
it did not entirely foreclose competition in the market for the patented
compound. 489 The court posited that a strategy of simply paying
potential generic competitors to stay off the market would ultimately
fail, because, at some point, the cost of paying off subsequent generic
challengers would exceed the ability of the patentee's
supracompetitive prices to support them. 490 Essentially, the court
challenged the plaintiffs implicit assumption that an agreement with
one generic firm could block all generic competition.4 91 In that case, it
is true that at least three subsequent generic companies challenged the
patent after Zeneca settled with the first challenger Barr, and Zeneca
did not settle with any of them.4 9 z Instead, Zeneca fully litigated the
cases and successfully defended its patent rights, thereby keeping
these generic competitors off of the market.
493
To the extent the Second Circuit's analysis is interpreted as
applying to reverse payment settlements in general, however, it seems
unrealistic in assuming minimal barriers to subsequent third party
generic entry. The analysis also seems inconsistent with general
antitrust doctrine. In general, it is true that horizontal market
allocation agreements would not negatively impact competition were
it not for some barrier to third party market entry, but courts have
classified such agreements as per se illegal regardless of the size of
entry barriers.494
Ciprofloxacin also endorses the position taken in Tamoxifen and
elsewhere that "it is unlikely that the holder of a weak patent could
488. See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227, 1236 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
See also Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 815 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 211-12,242-43.
489. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 215 (2d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert.filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2006) (No. 06-830).
490. See id. at 211-212.
491. In other words, the court assumed high barriers to generic entry.
492. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194-96.
493. Id.
494. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1995).
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stave off all possible challengers with exclusion payments because the
economics simply would not justify it."'495
In Tamoxifen, the Second Circuit posited that:
[W]hile the strategy of paying off a generic company to drop its
patent challenge would work to exclude that particular competitor
from the market, it would have no effect on other challengers of
the patent, whose incentive to mount a challenge would also grow
commensurately with the chance that the patent would be held
invalid. There is, of course, the possibility that the patent holder
will continue to buy out potential competition such that a
settlement with one generic manufacturer protecting the patent
holder's ill-gotten patent monopoly will be followed by other
settlements with other generic manufacturers should a second,
third, and fourth rise to challenge the patent. We doubt, however,
that this scenario is realistic. Every settlement payment to a generic
manufacturer reduces the profitability of the patent monopoly. The
point will come when there are simply no monopoly profits with
which to pay the new generic challengers. "[I]t is unlikely that the
holder of a weak patent could stave off all possible challengers
with exclusion payments because the economics simply would not
justify it."' 96
The reasoning in Tamoxifen is surely correct, if we are to assume
that barriers to third party generic entry are not prohibitive. However,
to the extent barriers to entry impede subsequent generic challengers,
the Second Circuit's rationale would appear to falter. In fact, as
previously discussed, the barriers to entry for subsequent generic
competitors can be substantial.497 With effective barriers to third party
generic entry in place, a reverse payment strategy could be
economically feasible and highly effective even in situations where
the merits of the patent case are weak, raising substantial competition
concerns.
On the other hand, barriers to third party generic entry are
generally not insurmountable, as evidenced by the number of cases
where reverse payment settlements have not prevented subsequent
third parties from entering the market.498 The barriers to generic entry
495. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 535
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
496. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211-12 (quoting Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 534-35)
(citation omitted).
497. See supra Section III.B.
498. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 215 (the settlement agreement "clear[ed] the way for other
generic manufacturers to seek to enter the market."); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
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will vary dramatically on a case-by-case basis. Significantly, Hatch-
Waxman has created an environment where the terms of the
settlement agreement itself can create substantial, or even, for a time,
insurmountable barriers to third party generic entry. 499 These barriers
to third party generic entry should figure prominently in any analysis
of the antitrust implications of reverse payment settlements.
An FTC commissioner recently acknowledged that reverse
payment settlements do not necessarily preclude third party generic
competition, but nevertheless expressed concern that a branded drug
company could successfully preclude all competition by entering into
reverse payment settlements with each and every potential generic
competitor, thereby foreclosing all competition. 500 One taking the
view of the Second Circuit might question the long-term economic
feasibility of such an approach, in view of the large number of
potential generic competitors, but it could be effective if barriers to
entry do in fact restrict the number of potential generic competitors to
a manageable pool. Until recently, it appears to have been rare for a
branded drug company to enter into reverse payment settlements with
multiple generic drug companies. 501 Branded drug companies
typically only enter reverse settlement agreement with the first
Paragraph IV filer, not with subsequent ANDA filers.5 °2
It bears noting that the FTC has a long history of, at times,
overzealous enforcement of the antitrust laws that have only been
reined in by the courts. Often, with the benefit of hindsight, even the
FTC comes to realize that an overly aggressive posture in enforcing
the antitrust laws, while motivated by a desire to protect U.S.
consumers, can actually have the opposite effect, by focusing unduly
on competition and ignoring the importance of efficiencies and
incentives to innovation in promoting the public interest.
5°3
1056, 1072-76 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006) (reverse payment
agreements with two generic companies did not exclude other potential generic competition).
499. See supra Section III.B.
500. Leibowitz Speech, supra note 77, at 6.
501. See, e.g., FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31.
502. Tamoxifen is just one example where the branded company enters a reverse payment
settlement with a first Paragraph IV filer but fully litigated the case against three subsequent
patent challengers. The FTC Generic Drug Study found that only one out of forty-three studied
Paragraph IV lawsuits involving second generic patent challengers were settled by means of an
agreement including a reverse payment. FTC GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 31, at 35-36.
503. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Comm'r, FTC, Competition and Intellectual Property
Policy: The Way Ahead, Prepared Remarks Before the American Bar Association Antitrust
Section Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm.
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There are many examples of enforcement excesses by the FTC
and DOJ, particularly in the area of patents and patent-related
agreements. For example, during the 1970's, these agencies
promulgated the now infamous "Nine No-No's," nine types of
licensing terms that were essentially treated as per se illegal.5 °4 Today,
the FTC acknowledges that this approach was misguided, "lack[ing]
both a sound economic foundation and a sufficient appreciation of the
incentives for innovation that intellectual property and intellectual
property licensing can provide., 50 5 In a 2003 report by the FTC that
discusses and makes recommendations for the patent system to
maintain a proper balance with competition law and policy, the
agency acknowledged that it erred in the past by treating "grant-back
clauses" in patent licensing agreements as per se illegal.50 6 The FTC
now notes that "antitrust enforcers recognize that '[g]rantbacks can
have procompetitive effects,' for example, by encouraging a patentee
to license its patent in the first place, thereby enabling the licensee's
improvement., 507 The report openly acknowledges that the FTC's
"overzealous antitrust enforcement can undermine the innovation that
patents promote., 50 8 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the
other federal agency tasked with enforcing the antitrust laws, the
DOJ, refused to back the FTC in its attempt to premise antitrust
liability on the existence of reverse payments.50 9
VI. THE FUTURE OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
As of now, arguments for presumptive illegality for reverse
payment settlement agreements have met with little success in the
courts, where the current consensus would not condemn such
settlements based merely on the existence or "excessiveness" of
reverse payments. 5  However, the FTC and other critics of reverse
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
507. Id. at 4 box.2.
508. Id.
509. U.S. Brief Recommending Denial of Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 20, at
17. See also Calkins, supra note 294 at 883 (the FTC, unlike the DOJ, is generally more
interested in winning its cases than in educating courts about economics).
510. See supra Section V.
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payments continue to push their position on a number of fronts, both
in the courts and with Congress.
511
In the courts, repeated attempts have been made to overturn
decisions rejecting presumptive illegality for reverse payment
settlements, particularly Valley Drug, 512 Schering-Plough 513 and
Tamoxifen.5 14 So far these attempts have met with no success, and, at
this point, the prospect for reversing the consensus approach as set
forth by the Second and Eleventh Circuits seems slim. Petitions for
rehearing en banc were denied with respect to Valley Drug,515
Cardizem5 16 and Schering-Plough,517 and the Supreme Court has
already denied petitions for certiorari in Valley Drug,18 Cardizem
519
and Schering-Plough. 5 20 A petition for certiorari is pending with
respect to .Tamoxifen, but the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant the
petition, primarily because of the absence of any significant split
between the circuits on the issue.521
A. Supreme Court Intervention Is Unlikely to Occur Soon
Of course, those familiar with the debate over the antitrust
implications of reverse payment settlements will recognize the oft-
511. See infra Section VIA-B.
512. See supra Section V.A.
513. See supra Section V.A.
514. See supra Section V.A.
515. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 88 F. App'x 388 (11 th Cir. 2003) (table of
denials), denying reh 'g en banc to 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
516. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying rehearing
en banc).
517. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 147 F. App'x 156 (11 th Cir. 2005) (table of denials),
denying reh 'g en banc to 402 F.3d 1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
518. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 543 U.S. 939 (2004), denying cert. to 344
F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
519. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004), denying cert. to Cardizem,
332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
520. FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006), denying cert. to 402 F.3d
1056 (1 1th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court also denied certiorari in a case involving an interim
settlement (the same settlement agreement at issue in Cardizem) including reverse payments
wherein the D.C. Circuit held that a reverse payment settlement parking GE was a restraint of
trade cognizable under the antitrust laws. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 535 U.S. 931
(2002), denying cert. to 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However, the focus of the decision and
arguments made in that case was on the manipulation and parking of GE, not on the per se
illegality of reverse payments.
521. Petition for Certiorari in Tamoxifen, supra note 448. As of the time this article was
written, the Supreme Court announced on March 19, 2007 that it would put off deciding the
petition for certiorari until later in the year, after receiving input from the Solicitor General.
Joblove v. Barr Labs., 75 U.S.L.W. 3497 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2007) (No. 06-830).
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made assertion that there exists a significant circuit split regarding the
legality of reverse payment settlements. This assertion is based
primarily on an interpretation of Cardizem as setting forth a rule of
per se illegality for reverse payment settlements in the Sixth
Circuit.522 The Eleventh and Second Circuit holdings in Valley Drug,
Schering-Plough and Tamoxifen have, in contrast, been variously
characterized as establishing either a rule of reason approach or
presumptive legality, but, in any event, a standard at odds with the
alleged rule of per se illegality in the Sixth Circuit.5 23
However, as explained above, a close reading of Cardizem
reveals that it actually never characterizes reverse payments are per se
illegal. The analysis instead focuses on the agreement's effect of
parking GE, thereby blocking third party generic market entry, and to
a lesser extent upon the extension of the agreement to non-infringing
products.524 While the court clearly viewed reverse payments as a
troubling element of the agreements, it was read in the context of the
agreement as a whole, and because the payments were seen as the
quid pro quo in exchange for which the patent challenger agreed to
restrictions exceeding the exclusionary potential of the patent. 525
Parking GE and the inclusion of non-infringing products are classic
examples of what courts characterize as the terms exceeding the
exclusionary potential of the patent, and an agreement having these
terms can clearly be found illegal under the Second and Eleventh
Circuit consensus tests.
The U.S. Solicitor General, the FTC, and some commentators
previously noted the lack of significant divergence between Cardizem
522. See supra Section V.A.
523. Various commentators have also asserted that a split exists between the circuits. See,
e.g., John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, II J. TECH. L.
& POL'Y 1, 28 (2006) ("The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals' application of a per se illegality standard for analyzing patent
settlements"); Lisa M. Natter, Infringement Lawsuits: The Continuing Battle Between Patent
Law and Antitrust Law in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 363, 364-
65 (2006) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari in order to decide
whether it is unlawful per se under the Sherman Act for a pharmaceutical patentee to pay a
competitor to keep the competitor's generic drug off the market during pending litigation
between the patentee and the competitor. The Sixth Circuit held that such an agreement is
inherently a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition for the drug in question, and is
therefore unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. In direct contrast, the Eleventh Circuit held
that such agreements were not unlawful per se, in part because the exclusion of infringing
competition 'is the essence of the patent grant."') (citations omitted).
524. The extension to non-infringing products received more attention in the district court
decision.
525. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003).
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and the consensus approach that focuses on restrictions exceeding the
exclusionary potential of the patent.526 In recommending the Supreme
Court deny certiorari in Schering-Plough, the U.S. Solicitor General
pointed out that the Cardizem decision involved payment to exclude
drugs that did not fall within the scope of the patent alleged to be
infringed, and thus it is far from clear that the per se rule employed by
the Sixth Circuit extends beyond the unique circumstances of that
case.527 In view of the fact that the agreements at issue in Tamoxifen
and Schering-Plough did not extend to drugs outside the patent claim,
the Solicitor General concluded that there was not necessarily any
tension between the approaches taken by the Sixth Circuit versus the
Second and Eleventh Circuits.528 In the end, the Solicitor General
concluded that there was no circuit split that would justify Supreme
Court review.529
The FTC also initially expressed the view that there is no tension
between Cardizem and the consensus approach of the Second and
Eleventh Circuits. In its brief opposing certiorari in Cardizem, the
FTC argued that although the outcomes of Cardizem and Valley Drug
diverged there is no necessary tension between the two decisions.53 °
The FTC pointed out that the agreement at issue in Cardizem had
been construed to exclude non-infringing and potentially non-
infringing products - restrictions extending beyond the exclusionary
potential of the patent - and thus could have been found illegal
under the Valley Drug test. 53 1 However, the FTC's later interpretation
of Cardizem appeared to shift.532 In its petition seeking certiorari in
Schering-Plough, the FTC suggests that Cardizem established a per se
rule against reverse payments settlements in the Sixth Circuit, and
cites to this as a basis for an alleged circuit split.5 33 Things have
apparently come full circle, however, for in a prepared statement
526. See, e.g., Burling, supra note 66 ("Notwithstanding an earlier Sixth Circuit decision
holding a Hatch-Waxman settlement per se illegal, there is no real split among the circuits.
Indeed, there is an emerging consensus in favor of the principles articulated by the Eleventh
Circuit.") (citations omitted).
527. U.S. Brief Recommending Denial of Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 20, at
17.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 17-20.
530. See FTC Brief Opposing Grant of Certiorari in Cardizem, supra note 96, at 15
("[T]he Eleventh Circuit was properly hesitant to recognize a square conflict between the two
decisions .... ).
531. Id. at 13.
532. See FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244.
533. Id. at 22.
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before Congress on January 18, 2007, the FTC does not suggest that
the rule in the Sixth Circuit is per se illegality for reverse payment
settlements.534
In their brief in support of its petition for certiorari, the plaintiffs
in Tamoxifen, not surprisingly, attempt to characterize the Second
Circuit's decision as creating a split with both the Eleventh and Sixth
Circuits,535 but the attempt is not overly convincing. With respect to
the Sixth Circuit, they simply repeat the tired assertion that Cardizem
announced a rule of per se illegality for reverse payment
settlements.
536
The Tamoxifen plaintiffs also attempt to identify a split between
the Eleventh and Second Circuits, alleging that the Eleventh Circuit's
test "inquires into the underlying validity of the patent at the time of
the exclusion payment before judging the validity of the reverse
payment agreement," citing to Valley Drug for this alleged test, while
the Second Circuit test would find reverse payment settlements per se
legal absent fraud.537 However, as explained above, the Eleventh and
Second Circuit tests can both be reasonably interpreted as requiring
only a minimal inquiry necessary to establish whether the agreement
exceeds the exclusionary potential of the patent, and it is not clear that
there is any substantial split between the circuits on this point
either.538 The Tamoxifen plaintiffs provide no analysis of the case law
to support their conclusory assertion that the Eleventh and Second
Circuit tests conflict with the other with respect to the level of inquiry
into the merits of the underlying patent dispute, nor do they even cite
to specific pages in Valley Drug or Schering-Plough as a source for
the asserted rule. 539 However, they do expand upon other alleged
inconsistencies between the tests of the two circuits, but, once again,
the attempt to establish a split is unconvincing.54 °
First, they note correctly that Valley Drug states that per se
illegality is inappropriate when, at the time of agreement, the patent
had not been held invalid or unenforceable. 541 However, in what
appears to be a flawed application of logic, they assert that it
534. See infra note 549.
535. See Petition for Certiorari in Tamoxifen, supra note 448.
536. Id. at 8.
537. Id. (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003)).
See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
538. See supra Section V.G.
539. See generally Petition for Certiorari in Tamoxifen, supra note 448.
540. Id. at 13-14.
541. Id. at 13 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306 & n.18).
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necessarily follows that, under the Eleventh Circuit's test, a patent
that has been found invalid by a district court at the time of the
agreement, but with an appeal pending, would be per se illegal. 542 One
does not follow from the other: a statement that under certain
conditions an agreement cannot be per se illegal does not require any
inference that, under different conditions, an agreement would be per
se illegal. To the contrary, Valley Drug and Schering-Plough both
clearly state that per se illegality is inappropriate for antitrust analysis
of any agreement involving a patent.543 The fact that the Tamoxifen
plaintiffs would even make this argument might be viewed as
indicative of the weak foundation for the allegation of a circuit split.
The other argument the Tamoxifen plaintiffs make in support of
an alleged circuit split is somewhat hard to follow, but appears to rest
on an assertion that the Eleventh Circuit would allow the court to
infer from an "excessive" reverse payment that the patentee knew that
the patent was invalid or procured by fraud, or that there was no
objective basis to believe that patent was valid.5 " If true, this would
constitute a divergence from Tamoxifen, wherein the Second Circuit
emphatically rejected plaintiffs argument that excessive size of the
payments was sufficient to prove that the agreements were illegal.545
However, this characterization of the Eleventh Circuit test is based on
an apparent misreading of the cases. In Schering-Plough, the court
explicitly states that "[w]e have said before, and we say it again, that
the size of the payment, or the mere presence of a payment, should not
dictate the availability of a settlement remedy." 546 This is also
consistent with the FTC's interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit test
with respect to the relevance of the size of payment. In its petition for
certiorari in Schering-Plough, the FTC states that the Eleventh Circuit
in Schering-Plough "concluded that the existence or size of such a
payment cannot be used to show that the patent holder has obtained a
greater degree of market exclusion than its patent justified., 547 Once
again, bearing in mind the different facts at issue in the specific cases,
there is no apparent substantial divergence between the Eleventh and
Second Circuit tests with respect to the legality of even "excessive"
reverse payment settlements.
542. Id.
543. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (citing Valley
Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311 n.27), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
544. Petition for Certiorari in Tamoxifen, supra note 448, at 13-14.
545. See supra Section V.E.
546. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis added).
547. FTC Petition for Certiorari in Schering-Plough, supra note 244, at 11.
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Even the FTC espouses the view that a split does not exist
between the Eleventh and Second Circuits. In a prepared statement
before the Senate's Special Committee on Aging, the FTC states that
Tamoxifen "followed the Eleventh Circuit's holding [in Schering-
Plough] and expressly embraced the 'sham' standard., 548 In its most
recent testimony before Congress, the FTC also backed off from
earlier characterizations of Cardizem as establishing a rule of per se
illegality for reverse payment settlements in the Sixth Circuit, instead
merely describing Cardizem as "holding a challenged exclusion
payment arrangement unlawful. 54 9 In that statement, the FTC also
reiterated its interpretation of Tamoxifen as following the holding of
Schering-Plough, with the test in both circuits requiring "only an
inquiry into the nominal reach of the patent.,
550
With both the DOJ and FTC taking the position that there is no
split, and in view of the Tamoxifen plaintiff's weak attempt to identify
a circuit split in their petition for certiorari, it appears likely that, with
Tamoxifen, the Supreme Court will continue its practice of declining
to intervene and overturn the consensus "exclusionary potential" test.
Not only is there no substantial split with respect to the
consensus standard for reviewing reverse payments settlements, the
consensus standard is consistent with longstanding judicial practice.
In a variety of contexts, agreements that would be treated as per se
antitrust violations, were it not for the presence of a patent dispute,
have been found legal, so long as any anticompetitive effects of the
agreement were limited to the exclusionary potential of the patent.
55 1
These courts noted that, by their very nature, patents are
anticompetitive, but that courts accept this as the nature of a patent,
and that the incentive value of patents outweighs these
anticompetitive consequences.1
52
Some have implied that, without Supreme Court intervention, the
Second Circuit's test will essentially be locked in as the law of the
land, because defendants will appeal all FTC decisions to the Second
548. FTC Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2, at 16 & n.52.
549. FTC January 2007 Senate Testimony, supra note 161, at 14.
550. Id. at 15-16.
551. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938)) (in order to
constitute an antitrust violation, a contractual restriction must be beyond the patent grant). See
cases cited supra note 302.
552. See Monsanto, 302 F.3d at 1298; United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H.,
670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204-06 (2d
Cir. 1981).
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Circuit.553 However, it should be recognized that plaintiffs and state
attorneys general can challenge reverse payment settlements under the
FTC theory of presumptive illegality, and these cases can be brought
in any circuit. In fact, such cases have been brought or are currently
pending in a variety of other circuits. 554 Moreover, in a recent
statement, FTC Commissioner Leibowitz specifically suggested a
strategy pursuant to which the FTC would challenge reverse
settlement agreements in various federal district courts in an attempt
to obtain a favorable ruling in a sympathetic circuit.555 Assuming the
Commissioner is correct in this assertion, clearly even the FTC has
latitude to seek a favorable decision in another circuit that would
create the desired circuit split. Of course, with the prolonged nature of
litigation, it is not surprising that the FTC would like a quicker
solution to the adverse precedent created by the decisions in the
Second and Eleventh Circuits.
B. Congress May Act to Ban Reverse Payment Settlements
On January 17, 2007, Senator Kohl (D-WI) and others
introduced the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act
("PAAG"), a bill that would ban certain reverse payment
settlements. 556 The bill's "Congressional Findings and Declaration
Purposes" comes out in strong support for the FTC's treatment of
reverse payment settlements, and criticizes the Eleventh and Second
Circuits' Schering-Plough and Tamoxifen decisions for "revers[ing]
the Federal Trade Commission's long-standing position [by
upholding the reverse payment settlements challenged in those
cases]. 557 The bill would introduce into the Clayton Act a new
553. See Lemley Brief Supporting Grant of Certiorari in Tamoxifen, supra note 448, at 9
n.9.
554. See, e.g., FTC Statement Before Aging Committee, supra note 2. There are reportedly
a number of reverse payment cases currently pending in other circuits, including the Third and
Ninth Circuits. Furthermore, there are motions to transfer some appeals to the Federal Circuit,
each representing a potential opportunity for a court to find a reverse payment settlement illegal
and create the circuit split sought by the FTC. See Bayer Brief Opposing Grant of Certiorari in
Schering-Plough, supra note 278, at 6 (identifying In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 338 F.
Supp. 2d 517 (D.N.J. 2004), and Kaiser Foundation v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 2:02cv2443
(C.D. Cal. filed March 22, 2002); and stating that there are motions to transfer some or all of the
appeals in the Second Circuit Tamoxifen and Ciprofloxacin litigations to the Federal Circuit).
555. Leibowitz Speech, supra note 77, at 8.
556. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007). It is
essentially an expanded version of Senate Bill 3582, a bill of the same name that was introduced
on June 27, 2006, but never acted on. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 3582,
109th Cong. (2006).
557. S. 316 § 2(a)(8).
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"Unlawful Interference with Generic Marketing" section that would
make it unlawful
for any person, in connection with the sale of a drug product, to
directly or indirectly be a party to any agreement resolving or
settling a patent infringement claim which - (1) an ANDA filer
receives anything of value; and (2) the ANDA filer agrees not to
research, develop, manufacture, market or sell the ANDA product
for any period of time.
558
In some ways, the bill proposes a standard that is much more
restrictive than that advocated by the FTC and most mainstream
critics of reverse payments settlements. For example, the bill would
outlaw even de minimis payments representing saved litigation
costs, 559 which the FTC and many commentators would concede as
legitimate.560 Even the FTC has noted that some reverse payments
might be pro-competitive, particularly when the generic company is
cash-strapped and the payments allow it to more rapidly and
effectively enter the market. 56' However, such payments would be
explicitly outlawed under the bill's heavy-handed approach.562
The bill adopts an expansive definition of "reverse payments
settlements. '" 563 It defines the term "payment" broadly as "anything of
value [other than an agreement to allow generic entry prior to patent
expiration] ,, 564 and "delay" as an agreement on the part of the generic
company not to "research, develop, manufacture, market, or sell [the
generic product] for any period of time." 565 The term "settlement" is
defined so as to encompass any situation involving an allegation of
patent infringement, "whether or not included in a complaint filed
with a court of law. 566
Furthermore, the bill is not limited to Paragraph IV settlements,
which were the focus of most critical commentary and of the FTC's
enforcement activities. 567 Its language would appear to apply to any
patent infringement suit filed, or even alleged, that involves an
ANDA applicant, even in cases where the patent owner is a third
558. Id. § 3.
559. Id.
560. See supra Section II.
561. See supra Section IV.B.
562. S. 316 § 3.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. See id
567. See supra Section 11, IV.
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party and not the NDA holder.568 For example, it would apparently
encompass a settlement of a patent dispute between two rival generic
companies - such generic versus generic lawsuits are reportedly
becoming increasingly common.
569
However, in certain respects, the PAAG defines reverse payment
settlements more narrowly than would the FTC and other critics of
reverse payments. For example, the bill's prohibition on reverse
payment settlements only applies to agreements that resolve or settle
the patent infringement claim, which would seem to exclude interim
settlements.5 70 This is somewhat surprising, since, as discussed above,
it is interim settlements, not final settlements, which have generally
been viewed most negatively by the FTC and the courts. 571 Cardizem
and Terazosin, two cases where reverse payments settlements were
found illegal, both involved interim settlements,572 and, to date, most
FTC enforcement actions have targeted interim settlements.573
Perhaps the bill's sponsors subscribe to the view that a restriction
on interim settlements substantially reduces the value of the 180-day
GE, by requiring a GE-holder with an approved ANDA to choose
either to enter the market "at risk" or to forgo any revenue prior to
final resolution of the patent litigation. Such a restriction would
render the GE exclusivity less attractive to generic companies, and
thus could act as a disincentive to future patent challenges, an
outcome contrary to the bill's primary objective of promoting patent
challenges.
The bill is also limited in that it only pertains to reverse payment
settlements that involve the sale of a drug product and an ANDA
filer. 5 While reverse payments settlements are considered rare
outside the context of Hatch-Waxman, they probably do exist.575 If
reverse payments are so lacking in any pro-competitive justification
to warrant per se illegality, which is essentially what the bill would
568. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
569. Aaron F. Barkoff, Orange Book Blog: Generic vs. Generic (Jan. 24, 2007),
http://www.orangebookblog.com/2007/01/genericvs gene.html (citing Teva Pharmaceuticals'
recent announcement that it has "sued several generic rivals who filed ANDAs for generic
Zoloft (sertraline HCI), alleging that the companies infringe Teva's patents on processes for
making sertraline 1-1").
570. S. 316 § 3.
571. See supra Sections II, IV.A, V.A.
572. See supra Section V.A.
573. See supra Section IV.A.
574. S. 316 § 3.
575. The Microsoft-Lindows settlement is an example, albeit with a different form of IP.
See supra notes 71-74.
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establish, why not an across the board ban on reverse payment
settlements of patent litigation, or, for that matter, intellectual
property litigation in general? In fact, courts repeatedly find that
reverse payment agreements arise naturally out of the Hatch-Waxman
scheme, even in cases where the patent owner is quite confident in the
merits of its patent case. 576 Outside the Hatch-Waxman context, it
seems more likely that reverse payments are indicative of bad intent
such as a sham or objectively baseless litigation, or collusion on the
part of the settling parties.
The bill's scope is effectively limited to the relatively small
category of patents that might be asserted in a Paragraph IV litigation,
in particular, patents covering drugs or methods of using drugs. This
could potentially raise the issue of TRIPS compliance. 5 77 Under
TRIPS Article 27.1, member nations are required to make
"patents... available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to... the field of technology., 578 Arguably, the bill
in its current form is discriminatory against a particular area of
technology, drugs, because a substantial limitation on the freedom to
settle patent litigation substantially reduces the value of these patents.
In considering whether the proposed bill would violate the anti-
discrimination provisions of Article 27.1, it is instructive to consider
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (Canada-
Generic Medicines), a case decided by the World Trade Organization
("WTO") in 2000. 5 79 The case was brought by the European Union
("EU"), which charged that various provisions of Canadian patent law
violated Article 27.1 by discriminating against pharmaceutical patent
owners. 580 In particular, the EU challenged section 55.2(1) of the
Canadian Patent Act, referred to as the "regulatory review exception,"
which provided that "[i]t is not an infringement of a patent for any
person to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information required under any law of Canada... that regulates the
manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.,
581
576. See supra Section V.C.
577. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
578. Id. art. 27.1.
579. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS1 14/R
(Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/7428d.pdf.
580. Id. 3. 1.
581. Id. 2. 1.
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There was no dispute that the provision was aimed primarily at
facilitating the timely approval of generic drugs, analogous to a
similar provision provided by U.S. law. 582 The EU argued that,
although the language of the statute literally applied to any patented
invention used in securing regulatory approval for any product, the
purpose of the exemption was aimed entirely to benefit generic drug
manufacturers, and that the de facto effect of the provision was
limited to pharmaceutical products.583
If these allegations had been proven, the WTO Panel hearing the
case might have found the Canadian provision to- be in violation of
Article 27.1. However, the Panel concluded that the EU failed to
establish discrimination. 584 It began by finding no literal
discrimination, noting that the exemption was literally not limited to
pharmaceutical products, but is available to any product subject to
regulatory approval.58 5 The Panel intimated that if the practical effect
of the provision was limited to pharmaceuticals, it could be
considered de facto discrimination in violation of TRIPS.586 However,
the Panel concluded that the EU did not demonstrate a discriminatory
effect that was limited to pharmaceutical products. 587 The Panel
agreed with the EU that the legislative history and public discourse
relating to the adoption of section 55.2(1) clearly indicated that the
purpose of the legislation was to target pharmaceuticals, but this in
itself was not enough to prove that the statutes literal extension to
non-pharmaceutical patents was a "sham, or of no actual or potential
importance., 588 In the absence of a sham, the motivation behind the
passage of the statute was not enough to infer literal or de facto
discriminatory effect.
589
GAAP, on the other hand, on its face, applies particularly to
pharmaceutical patents and substantially weakens the rights of the
owners of the patents relative to the rights of other patent owners.5
Under the test applied by the WTO Panel in Canada-Generic
Medicines, it is not clear that the provision would withstand a
challenge at the WTO for a violation of Article 27.1.
582. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
583. Panel Report, supra note 579, 4.5.
584. Id. 7.99-7.105.
585. Id. 7.99.
586. Id. 7.101.
587. Id. 7.102.
588. Id. 7.104.
589. Id.
590. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007).
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In view of the low probability that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari on Tamoxifen, it should come as no surprise that the FTC is
lobbying hard to convince Congress to intervene and make reverse
payment settlements illegal by statute. On January 17, 2007, FTC
Commissioner Leibowitz testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee to voice the FTC's support for the intent behind the
PAAG. 591
The FTC was careful never to specifically endorse the PAAG, at
least in its current form, but rather restricted itself to an endorsement
of the intent behind the legislation. 592 The FTC implicitly
recommended revision of the current version of the bill and offered a
number of suggestions in that regard. 593 First, the FTC stressed that
the legislation must be sufficiently broad to "encompass the various
ways that a branded firm may share its profits with the generic,
including not only the ways we have seen to date, but also those that
may arise in the future. ' 59 4 After many years of experience with
Hatch-Waxman, the FTC is only too aware of the virtually unlimited
creativity of pharmaceutical companies and their lawyers in devising
strategies for delaying generic competition while staying within the
letter of the law. The FTC also stressed how important it was for the
law to encompass all arrangements that are part of the settlement,
even if not part of the written agreement. 595 This concern seems to be
addressed by section 4 of the bill, which provides, inter alia, that a
responsible corporate official must execute and file with the Assistant
Attorney General and the FTC "written descriptions of any oral
agreements, representations, commitments, or promises between the
parties" to a patent settlement agreement between a generic and a
branded company.
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On the other hand, the FTC warned against legislative measures
that might unduly deter settlement. 597 The FTC endorses the view of
Judge Posner and others that all settlements provide some
compensation to the generic, even if nothing more than termination of
the litigation. 598 It advises Congress to be careful not to restrict
settlement options unlikely to involve a sharing of profits preserved
591. FTC January 2007 Senate Testimony, supra note 161, at 22.
592. See id.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007).
597. FTC January 2007 Senate Testimony, supra note 161, at 22.
598. Id.
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by avoiding competition, citing as specific examples: agreements to
split the time to patent expiration, a waiver of the brand's market
exclusivity based on testing of a drug for pediatric use, or "a waiver
of patent infringement damages against a generic for entry that has
already occurred." 599 Under the bill's current language, it is unclear
whether at least the second and third scenarios would be legal.60 0
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts are generally unreceptive to attempts to characterize
patent settlements as illegal based on the mere presence or amount of
reverse payments, or to theories of antitrust liability based on the
probabilistic nature of patents or a consumer expectation interest in
the chance a patent challenge will succeed in the absence of a
settlement. On the other hand, courts will find reverse payment
settlement in violation of the antitrust laws to the extent that the
agreement contains restrictions on competition that exceed the
exclusionary potential of the patent. This typically occurs when the
agreement extends to clearly non-infringing products or activities, or
when the parking of GE creates a substantial, or even insurmountable,
barrier to third party generic entry.
Absent GE parking or restrictions on non-infringing products,
the courts are reluctant to find reverse payment settlements
fundamentally different than patent settlements in general, because
the reverse payments are viewed as a natural by-product of the Hatch-
Waxman scheme .601 At the same time, the FTC and most courts
conclude that any detailed assessment of the merits of the underlying
patent dispute is probably unwise in the context of an antitrust
analysis, at least when the patent litigation does not appear to be
objectively baseless and the agreement restrictions do not exceed the
nominal boundaries of the patent. 60 2 Nevertheless, in some cases,
these agreements seem clearly to impede the introduction of generic
drugs on the market, and with the rising cost of drugs and healthcare
in general, some level of antitrust scrutiny might well be in order.
An alternative analytical framework that has not received much
explicit attention, with the notable exception of GE parking, is the
role of barriers to third party generic entry. Perhaps it is these barriers,
rather than reverse payments per se, that provide a more meaningful
599. Id. at 22-23.
600. S. 316§3.
601. See supra Section V.C.
602. See supra Section V.G.
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basis for distinguishing anticompetitive Paragraph IV settlements
from other patent settlements. A focus on barriers to third party
generic entry would help to quantify the anticompetitive potential of a
particular Paragraph IV settlement, and of Paragraph IV settlements
in general. If barriers to third party generic entry are unusually high,
then not only are these agreements likely to be effective in impeding
all generic competition, they are deserving of close antitrust scrutiny.
On the other hand, if barriers to third party entry are not so high, then
there is less danger to competition and less need for rigorous antitrust
enforcement.
An explicit assessment of third party generic entry could be
relevant in several ways. First, it might be used to convince courts
that Paragraph IV settlements, particularly those including reverse
payments, really are fundamentally different than other patent
settlements, because barriers to third party generic entry have the
effect of leveraging an agreement with a single generic competitor
into a tool for effectively excluding all generic competition for a
substantial amount of time.
Second, even if this could not be established in the general case
of Paragraph IV or reverse payment settlements, perhaps in the case
of individual agreements, a sufficient showing of barriers to third
party generic entry might convince a court that a particular
agreement, by effectively excluding all competition for multiple
years, is sufficiently anticompetitive to violate the antitrust laws.
Consider, for example, a case where there is a single generic
Paragraph IV filer that has received final FDA approval to enter the
market with a generic, no other ANDAs have been filed, and the
patent owner and generic enter a reverse payment settlement.
Regardless of whether GE is parked, regulatory barriers to third party
generic entry will effectively turn the settlement into a complete bar
to any generic competition for at least several years. This agreement
might warrant antitrust scrutiny exceeding that of a typical patent
settlement, particularly if it can be shown that the patent owner or the
settling generic played some role in discouraging other generic
companies from filing ANDAs.
An assessment of barriers to third party entry in evaluating the
antitrust implications of an agreement occurs in other contexts. For
example, in the FTC and DOJ's "Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors," the agencies discuss the
necessity of evaluating whether third party entry would be "timely,
likely and sufficient to counteract any anticompetitive harms" in a
2007]
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Rule of Reason analysis of an alleged collaboration agreement
between competitors.
60 3
Third, it may be worth exploring whether there are approaches
other than antitrust law that could have the effect of lowering barriers
to third party generic entry. To the extent these barriers could be
lowered, this would obviate the need for relying on antitrust
enforcement to bring about generic competition. If the barriers to
third party generic entry were low enough, then assertions such as
those made by the court in Tamoxifen would actually hold true - the
strategy of precluding generic competition by reverse payment
settlements would encounter limited success because of subsequent
third party patent challenges. Since, in the context of a Paragraph IV
litigation, the barriers to third party generic entry are, to a large
extent, a product of regulatory law, we would do well to at least
consider whether reforms of Hatch-Waxman, or the FDCA in general,
might be able to reduce the regulatory burden facing third party
generic competitors. This is, of course, exactly what Hatch-Waxman
did so successfully, for example, by creation of the ANDA to reduce
the regulatory burden of the ANDA process.6 °4 Alternatively, reforms
in the manner in which FDA implements the drug regulatory laws
might also be made with the objective of reducing barriers to third
party generic entry.
A prime target for any reform of Hatch-Waxman intended to
reduce barriers to third party generic entry would, of course, be the
180-day GE provisions. The ability to park GE represents the most
substantial Paragraph IV litigation-specific barrier to third party
generic entry. In the 2003 Medicare Amendments, Congress
substantially amended the Hatch-Waxman provisions relating to the
180-day GE, most importantly defining forfeiture events with the
express purpose of preventing GE parking and thereby reducing this
barrier to third party generic entry.605 As noted by the FTC and others,
it is doubtful that the amendments were entirely successful in this
regard. 606 For example, in Commissioner Leibowitz's recent
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he noted the
continuing problem of parking GE and proposed additional legislative
amendments to address the problem.60 7 Although this is a topic for
603. LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 11.
604. See supra Section III.B.2.
605. See supra Section 111.B.2.
606. See, e.g., FTC January 2007 Senate Testimony, supra note 161.
607. Id. at 23-25.
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another article, I would suggest that Congress might be better served
by simply eliminating GE. This would avoid the problem of parking
that Congress and the courts have had so much trouble correcting.
Additionally, it is not at all clear that the incentive of 180-day GE is
actually required to incentivize generic companies to mount patent
challenges, particularly in the case of the most important blockbuster
drugs.6°8
608. See Engelberg, supra note 121 (remarking that the 180-day period was "ill-
conceived" and that generic manufacturers have become skilled at developing bioequivalent
products around pharmaceutical patents).
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